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Introduction
THE FOCUS ON WHITE-COLLAR CRIME has increased following
the corporate scandals of the late 1990s, and has been buttressed by
the popular perception that white-collar criminals are not punished
enough. Despite the long sentences alleged wrongdoers like Jeff Skill-
ing of Enron,1 Bernie Ebbers of Worldcom,2 and Joseph Nacchio of
Qwest3 have received, popular opinion remains that the law is too le-
nient on this class of offenders.4 The retributive impulse of the mob’s
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1. See Andrew Weissmann & Joshua A. Block, White-Collar Defendants and White-Collar
Crimes, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 286 (2007), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/images/
pdfs/105.pdf.
2. Convicted and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. United States v. Eb-
bers, 458 F.3d 110, 129 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Twenty-five years is a long sentence for a white
collar crime, longer than the sentences routinely imposed by many states for violent
crimes, including murder, or other serious crimes such as serial child molestation.”).
3. Convicted on nineteen counts of insider trading, sentenced to six years in prison,
and ordered to pay $19 million in fines. Andy Vuong, Full Court Upholds Nacchio Insider
Trading Conviction, THE DENVER POST, Feb. 25, 2009, available at http://www.denverpost.
com/business/ci_11782036.
4. Penalties for White Collar Crime: Hearings Before the Subcom. on Crime and Drugs, of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 2 (2002) [hereinafter U.S. Senate Hearings], available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/107hrg/86740.pdf (statement of Sen.
Joseph R. Biden, Jr., U.S. Sen. from Del.) (“[T]he strange thing is when it comes to those
who rob us with a pen, rob us with a pencil, rob us with their financial shenanigans, or they
steal from us, to be more precise, they tend to go to jail less than someone who would steal
the same amount of money from us in a circumstance where they broke into our house.”).
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baying for blood after Enron’s collapse was not sated by the untimely
death of Ken Lay shortly after his conviction; they claimed that “jus-
tice had been cheated.”5 This societal turn to vengeance seems to be
at the root of the creeping criminalization of conduct that was tradi-
tionally dealt with by other areas of the law, as reflected in the fact
that of the approximately 3000 crimes in the federal statute books,
over 1200 were created since 1970.6 Virtually every case of new legisla-
tion aimed at behavior modification seems to entail shrill claims about
the need for criminalization, upon the pretext that civil sanctions do
not pack enough punch.7 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 is just one
example of this phenomenon, enhancing existing penalties and creat-
ing new criminal offenses in the wake of Enron’s collapse.8 Creeping
Three local polls after Skilling’s conviction and sentencing showing that forty-six percent
thought his sentence was “not tough enough”; thirty-eight percent thought it was “too leni-
ent”; and forty percent thought “he deserves more time.” Brief of Defendant-Appellant at
143 n.79, United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-20885).
5. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 143–44 (quoting trial juror: “I
feel bad for the people who really wanted to see [Lay] go to jail, that they needed the
closure and they’re not going to get it. You would hope [it] would be enough . . . that we
came back guilty.”).
6. See REPORT OF THE ABA TASK FORCE ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 7–9
(1998) (approximately eighty-three percent of all federal criminal statutes have been en-
acted since 1930, and almost forty percent of all federal criminal statutes have been en-
acted in since 1970); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections
on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 198 (1991)
(critiquing the ever increasing tendency to authorize criminal sanctions for conduct that is
indistinguishable from tort). See generally Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New
Principles to Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979
(1995); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46
HASTINGS L.J. 1135 (1995); Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled
Basis for Federal Criminal Legislation, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 15 (1996) (dis-
cussing overcriminalization).
7. See Susan L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Ap-
parent Innocence” in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 32 (1995) (“In contemporary
America virtually every regulatory scheme, particularly in federal law, includes felony crimi-
nal enforcement provisions to add ‘teeth’ to the costs of noncompliance, covering such
diverse areas as environmental safety, securities markets, employment practices, consumer
protection, public benefits, and international trade. Estimates suggest that over three hun-
dred thousand federal regulations are punishable by criminal penalties enforceable
through the combined efforts of as many as two hundred different federal agencies.”).
8. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 807(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2006) (imposing
fines and/or up to twenty-five years imprisonment for any individual who “knowingly exe-
cutes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud any person in connection
with any security of an issuer . . . ; or (2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations, or promises, any money or property in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security of an issuer . . .”); id. § 1350 (penalizing CEOs and CFOs
for certifying statements they know fail to comport with the requirements of the Act, im-
posing fines of up to $1 million and/or imprisonment of up to ten years); id. § 1512(c)
(imposing a fine and/or a twenty year maximum prison term on any person who “cor-
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criminalization has serious ramifications: it undermines the coercive
power of the criminal law, dilutes its expressive power,9 over-deters
otherwise desirable business activities,10 conflates blameworthiness
with imprisonment, creates incentives for prosecutors to abuse their
powers, fuels an appetite for enhancing prison terms,11 and increases
social costs. Most importantly, it punishes people for actions that are
not even civil wrongs,12 let alone undertaken with the taint of moral
wrongfulness.13
This Article is restricted to white-collar crimes involving corpo-
rate fiduciaries who make bad decisions at the expense of sharehold-
ers (corporate governance offenses). It does not address white-collar
crimes that have a moral wrongfulness component, such as tax eva-
sion, bribery, perjury, extortion, fraud, and embezzlement.14 To the
extent that white-collar crimes are blameworthy, this Article argues
ruptly—(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or
attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an
official proceeding; or (2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceed-
ing, or attempts to do so . . .”).
9. See Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the
Problem with Environmental Crime, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 867, 883 (1994) (“The reason why
criminal sanctions have greater deterrent value is also the reason why they must be used
more selectively. Criminal sanctions should be reserved for the more culpable subset of
offenses and not used solely for their ability to deter.”).
10. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Prefer-
ence-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (“High criminal penalties will deter people from
desirable, but only marginally lawful, activity because they are uncertain whether they will
be convicted of a crime.”); see also Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Non-
monetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985).
11. See John M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the
Severity of Prison Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 189, 199–201, 204 (2005).
12. See Wendy Gerwick Couture, White Collar Crime’s Gray Area: The Anomaly of Criminal-
izing Conduct Not Civilly Actionable, 72 ALB. L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“[T]he imposition of crimi-
nal punishment for conduct not civilly actionable risks disrupting the current scheme of
securities regulation, at the expense of considerations deemed important by Congress and
the courts. The lower materiality standard and the unavailability of the safe harbor in crim-
inal cases may chill corporate disclosure and may affect what information reasonable inves-
tors rely upon when making investment decisions.”).
13. See Mary Flood, ‘All-Star Team’ of Federal Prosecutors Says Merit of Cases Outweighs
Hardship, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 19, 2004, at Bus. 1, available at http://www.chron.com/disp/
story.mpl/special/enron/2953693.html (quoting Enron Task Force Prosecutor: “Defend-
ants and suspects understand that if you’re selling drugs or if you rob somebody or if you
take their car, that that was wrong . . . . But the issue we face first in Enron is, was this
conduct criminal? When dealing with violent crime cases or even narcotics cases, that’s
never a question. That’s always very, very black and white. Here we have to spend a lot of
time figuring out what was done and figuring out whether that was a violation of the crimi-
nal law.”).
14. Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization
and the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1537 (1997) (“‘[M]oral
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that the determination of wrongdoing must be disentangled from the
determination of punishment—which much of the legal scholarship
in this area does not do. Disentanglement of blame from deserts sug-
gests a via media between criminalization and decriminalization—
criminalization without incarceration. Accordingly, the criminal legal
process stops at the determination of guilt.
This Article advances the criminalization debate in a novel way
because it does not get bogged down in the irreconcilable quarrel
about whether corporate governance misbehavior ought to be
criminalized for deterrence, retribution, or rehabilitation reasons,
and rather addresses whether criminalization actually achieves any of
these purposes. Irrespective of the theoretical justification underpin-
ning the decision to criminalize, imprisonment must not follow con-
viction. The conviction, despite the lack of incarceration, and the
consequential sanctions likely to be imposed on the wrongdoer are
sufficient to satisfy the three main justifications for criminalization:
incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence.15 In appropriate cases,
disgorgement of the offender’s gains will also aid in the achievement
of these objectives.16
This proposed model would yield significant savings by reducing
prison costs,17 while also allowing the state to take advantage of the
disproportionate cost/burden of conviction on white-collar offenders.
wrongfulness’ . . . is present if the conduct made criminal is viewed by a consensus of
society as immoral or in violation of a moral norm.”).
15. To the extent that further action is necessary, there are alternatives to imprison-
ment. See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 195 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1999) (imposing proba-
tion condition preventing defendant from working in law office or “any institution in the
business of providing legal services”); United States v. Whitlow, 979 F.2d 1008, 1012 (5th
Cir. 1992) (preventing defendant from working in used car industry); United States v.
Burnett, 952 F.2d 187, 190 (8th Cir. 1991) (preventing defendant from working in business
that requires travel or selling vending machines).
16. SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The district court
has broad equity powers to order the disgorgement of ‘ill-gotten gains’ obtained through
the violation of the securities laws. Disgorgement is designed to deprive a wrongdoer of
unjust enrichment, and to deter others from violating securities laws by making violations
unprofitable.” (internal citations omitted)).
17. Incarceration is extremely costly. As one expert notes,
Between 1982 and 2006, direct expenditures by federal, state, and local govern-
ments on corrections jumped from $9 billion to $68.7 billion, an increase of over
618%. During the same period, combined criminal justice expenditures (for po-
lice, judicial, and corrections activities) by federal, state, county, and municipal
governments rose from $35.7 billion in 1982 to $214.3 billion in 2006.
Over Criminalization of Conduct and Over-Federalization of Criminal Law: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
3 (2009) available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Saltzburg090722.pdf (testi-
mony of Prof. Stephen A. Saltzburg on behalf of the American Bar Association).
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Owing to the offenders’ high earning potential,18 deterrence can be
achieved at lower cost by conviction alone because the destruction of
the offender’s capacity to generate similar (or, indeed, any) income is
suffered by the offender even without going to jail.19 If the cost of
incarceration is the same for offenders with different earning capaci-
ties, imprisoning those with very high earning capacities is a waste of
social capital, especially if the objectives of incarceration can be
achieved through other means. Further, the cost of a conviction can
be predicted with sufficient certainty in the case of white-collar
criminals by looking at their earnings history, and in many cases this
can be a significant sum. Unlike the common criminal who may not
have a similarly predictable earning capacity and therefore may not
suffer the same extent of monetary loss from a conviction, this loss
ought to serve the deterrence function without the need for the state
to spend money imprisoning the offender. In addition to the loss of
earning capacity, clawing back ill-gotten gains would significantly add
to the disutility.20
Part I briefly outlines the scope of the wrongs tackled as stem-
ming from the principal-agent relationship in corporate law and the
inability of the law to effectively overcome problems resulting from
the collectivization of the principal in that relationship. Part II argues
that conviction without imprisonment is a second-best alternative to
decriminalization in cases where the conduct is blameworthy, and re-
sults in non-consensual harm. Part III demonstrates the disutility
18. A 2006 Wall Street Journal compensation survey of CEOs of thirty-five large U.S.
corporations showed a median salary and bonus of $2,598,284, with the median base salary
accounting for about $1 million of that amount. See The WSJ 350: A Survey of CEO Compensa-
tion, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2007, at R1.
19. For example, an offender’s capacity to generate income is hampered by bar or-
ders against serving as an officer and/or director of companies.
20. See SEC v. Cavanagh, 445 F.3d 105, 117 (2d Cir. 2006) (The purpose is to “prevent
wrongdoers from unjustly enriching themselves through violations, which has the effect of
deterring subsequent fraud. . . . The emphasis on public protection, as opposed to simple
compensatory relief, illustrates the equitable nature of the remedy.”); Litigation Release
No. 20387, SEC, Former United Health Group CEO/Chairman Settles Stock Options Backdating
Case for $468 Million (Dec. 6, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2007/
lr20387.htm; see also Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304, 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2006) (“If an
issuer is required to prepare an accounting restatement due to the material noncompli-
ance of the issuer, as a result of misconduct, with any financial reporting requirement
under the securities laws, the chief executive officer and chief financial officer of the issuer
shall reimburse the issuer for—(1) any bonus or other incentive-based or equity-based
compensation received by that person from the issuer during the 12-month period follow-
ing the first public issuance or filing with the Commission (whichever first occurs) of the
financial document embodying such financial reporting requirement; and (2) any profits
realized from the sale of securities of the issuer during that 12-month period.”).
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caused by conviction alone and shows that the objectives of criminal-
ization can be satisfied without the need for imprisonment. Part IV
asserts that consequential sanctions like shaming add to the disutility
of conviction. And finally, Part V illustrates the problems with conflat-
ing blame and punishment by tying the thesis to Skilling’s conviction
for bad business judgment devoid of moral wrongfulness.
I. Scope of Wrongs Covered
What is white-collar crime and why should it be criminalized? The
oft-cited definition proposed by the criminologist Edwin Sutherland—
“those crimes committed by persons of respectability and high social
status in the course of their occupations”—is now seen to be severely
problematic.21 There is no normative justification for treating crimi-
nal behavior by those of a high social status differently from crimes
committed by the hoi polloi.22 A murder committed by a person from
a higher class is still murder, and to define crimes based on economic
status alone makes little sense. It is more useful to define it in terms of
the criminal behavior—white-collar crime usually involves the behav-
ior itself having the veneer of respectability and is mala prohibita23
rather than mala in se.24 Frequently, the conduct at issue only invites
attention because it was seen to be too aggressive by regulators, when
the actors themselves only believed they were engaging in legitimately
risky enterprise.25
21. EDWIN HARDIN SUTHERLAND & DONALD R. CRESSEY, CRIMINOLOGY 40 (Lippincott
1974) (In contrast, the FBI defined white-collar crime as “[t]hose illegal acts which are
characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust and which are not dependent
upon the application or threat of physical force or violence . . . .”).
22. See STUART P. GREEN, LYING, CHEATING, AND STEALING: A MORAL THEORY OF WHITE
COLLAR CRIME 3 (2006) (“[T]he strikingly broad range of moral judgments that surrounds
such cases has less to do with the identity of individual defendants than with deeper moral
ambiguities, confusions, and uncertainties that pervade our understanding of white-collar
crime more generally.”).
23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 960 (6th ed. 1990) (defining a “malum prohibitum” of-
fense as an “act which is not inherently immoral, but becomes so because its commission is
expressly forbidden by positive law”).
24. Id. at 956 (defining “mala in se” offenses as “[w]rongs in themselves; acts morally
wrong; offenses against conscience”).
25. See Marilyn E. Walsh & Donna D. Schram, The Victim of White-Collar Crime: Accuser or
Accused, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME: THEORY AND RESEARCH 32, 36 (Gilbert Geis & Ezra
Stotland eds., 1980) (“Instead of there being a clear consensus about the unacceptability of
the conduct in rape and white-collar crimes, there is a tendency to view the conduct as
associated with otherwise acceptable behavior. Thus, rape may be identified as behavior
distinguished from approved conduct only by its location on the more aggressive end of a
continuum of demonstration of sexual prowess. Similarly, many frauds and larcenies by
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This Article focuses only on a subset of white-collar offenders:
corporate fiduciaries abusing the principal-agent relationship. The
core arguments could be extended to other kinds of white-collar
crime as well, because, in many cases, conviction without incarcera-
tion would satisfy the objectives of criminalization. The principal-
agent relationship is especially pregnant with potential for abuse be-
cause of its inherently asymmetric nature. Agents are primarily em-
ployed in order to make up for the gaps in expertise, skill, and time
that prevent principals from accomplishing the delegated tasks on
their own. Yet these advantages enjoyed by agents also create
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard.
Principals attempt to remain the master of the relationship by
implementing such carrot-and-stick structures as keeping a close rein
on agents and circumscribing discretion, co-opting the agent into
ownership of the enterprise, tying incentives to the principal’s re-
turns, and carefully selecting the agent. However, when applied at the
corporate level, the collectivization of the principal creates incentives
for free riding and rational apathy. Shareholders, even if they care to
monitor management, might have very different objectives—ranging
from the employee union shareholder’s desire to protect jobs to large
institutional investors’ focus on profits. Furthermore, when manage-
ment is perceived to be inadequate, most shareholders prefer to exit
rather than take corrective action. These factors debilitate the moni-
toring power of principals to a point where the agent is the de facto
master of the relationship. Thus, although in theory the shareholders
are the principals, it is the management that exercises the greater
power, primarily because of real barriers to removal caused by collec-
tive action problems and the deference that corporate law accords to
business decisions taken by management.
This Article addresses whether such agency problems should be
the subject matter of criminal law with imprisonment as the sanction
or whether they are better suited to civil or social sanctions.26 Crimi-
nal sanctions have been used, for example, in the Skilling case, de-
spite the prosecution framing the case in terms that invoke the agency
trick or false pretenses can be viewed as excesses in what is normally accepted, aggressive
salesmanship or shrewd economic behavior.”).
26. See Larry E. Ribstein, Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs 2 (Ill. Law & Econ. Working
Papers Series, Paper No. LE06-021, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=920140 (“We don’t want to spend $100 to catch $10 of cheating. This
raises questions about when an agent’s unfaithfulness deserves any kind of sanction, and
especially about when it crosses the line to criminal.”).
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cost problem.27 This resort to criminal law has been justified on the
plea that the principals are not the only victims of Skilling’s wrongdo-
ing, but that his conduct engendered wider societal harm. It might
also be evidence of the vicious nature of the retributive impulse fol-
lowing loss, even when some of the loss is the byproduct of consensual
risk taking.28 Shareholders, employees, and the wider public feel the
urge to punish those at the top for bad bets despite the absence of
moral wrongfulness, and the criminal law serves as an instrument for
such punishment.
Crimes with a mens rea element are not problematic; therefore,
this Article addresses only those offenses where the defendants were
most likely acting in the belief that their conduct was legal. This is
particularly plausible in cases involving the interpretation of complex
accounting rules or risky business decisions. The problem with
criminalizing this sort of behavior is that the traditional purposes of
criminal punishment—deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, reha-
bilitation, and restitution—are ill matched with the results that princi-
pals seek. Principals’ objectives can be achieved at much lower cost
either by social or civil sanctions without the need for the expenditure
of state resources. The employment of criminal law to combat agency
abuses is particularly troubling when the state is content to criminalize
based on alleged obstructions of justice rather than proving the un-
derlying allegations. The cases of Martha Stewart29 and Frank Quat-
trone30 are illustrative of this trend.
27. See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 2, United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529
(5th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-20885); id. at 71 (closing argument by the prosecution: “[M]ake no
mistake, they [Skilling and Lay] got wealthy. . . . And in exchange for that money, they
owed their employees a duty, a duty of good faith and honest services, a duty to be truthful, and
a duty to do their job, ladies and gentlemen, to do their job and do it appropriately.”
(emphasis added)).
28. Epithets used against Skilling included “pig,” “snake,” “evil,” “crook,” “thief,”
“fraud,” “asshole,” “criminal,” “bastard,” “scoundrel,” “liar,” “weasel,” and “economic ter-
rorist.” He was described as “dirty,” “deceitful,” “dishonest,” “greedy,” “amoral,” “devious,”
“lecherous,” “manipulative,” “unscrupulous,” “despicable,” “equivalent [to] an axe mur-
derer” who has “no conscience,” “stole from employees,” and “swindled a lot of people.”
He was condemned as “guilty as sin,” something for which “he need[ed] . . . to pay the
price,” go to “jail for 20 years,” and “be hanged.” Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note
4, at 134.
29. United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 280, 319–20 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming
conviction).
30. United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 161 (2d Cir. 2006) (obstruction of jus-
tice conviction subsequently vacated).
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II. Moral Ambiguity of White-Collar Crime
A. Crime Must Be Morally Blameworthy
There must be a fundamental distinction based on the moral
blameworthiness of conduct if our distinctions between criminal and
civil sanctions are to have any merit.31 Misapplication of the criminal
label to conduct that is not intrinsically wrong is counterproductive to
the objectives sought to be achieved by criminalization.32 As Professor
Stuart Green wrote in a recent work, “[w]hat is interesting and distinc-
tive about [white collar crime] is that, in a surprisingly large number
of cases, there is genuine doubt as to whether what the defendant was
alleged to have done was in fact morally wrong.”33 This is a major
problem, as Green recognizes, because “when there is a gap between
what the law regards as morally wrongful and what a significant seg-
ment of society views as such, moral conflict and ambiguity are likely
to be the result.”34 This sort of ambiguity severely affects what Profes-
sor Andrew Ashworth calls the “principle of fair labeling,” because it
fails to ensure “that widely felt distinctions between kinds of offences
and degrees of wrongdoing are respected and signaled by the law, and
that offences should be divided and labeled so as to represent fairly
the nature and magnitude of the law-breaking.”35 However, Green ar-
31. See Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of Desert, 76 B.U.
L. Rev. 201 (1996); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments on the
Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CON-
TEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69 (1996); Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at
the Junction of Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97 (1996);
Carol S. Steiker, Foreword—Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil
Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775 (1997).
32. Paul H. Robinson, Moral Credibility and Crime, ATL. MONTHLY, Mar. 1995, at 72, 77
(“As the label ‘criminal’ is increasingly applied to minor violations of a merely civil nature,
criminal liability will increasingly become indistinct from civil and will lose its particular
stigma.”); see also Green, supra note 14, at 1536 (“In short, these critics contend, applying
criminal sanctions to morally neutral conduct is both unjust and counterproductive. It
unfairly brands defendants as criminals, weakens the moral authority of the sanction, and
ultimately renders the penalty ineffective. It also squanders scarce enforcement resources
and invites selective, and potentially discriminatory, prosecution. We should reserve the
criminal law—the ‘heavy artillery’ of our legal system . . . —for conduct that reflects the
traditional conception of criminality.”).
33. GREEN, supra note 22, at 1 (“It is . . . the manifestation of a widely felt sense—
expressed by judges, jurors, scholars, journalists, and the average citizen—that the law in
this area involves a kind of moral uncertainty that distinguishes it from that which governs
more familiar ‘core’ cases of crime . . . .”).
34. Id. at 46.
35. Id. at 42.
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gues that white-collar crimes correspond well to moral norms of a
common-sense sort:36
[C]ertain fine-grained distinctions in our criminal law are a reflec-
tion of equally fined-grained [sic] distinctions in our moral think-
ing, and vice versa.37 Thus, white-collar crime doctrine that may at
first glance seem puzzling and internally inconsistent can often be
explained through reflection on the moral concepts that underlie
it. And, by the same token, ostensibly baffling distinctions we make
in our everyday moral lives can in some cases be traced to distinc-
tions that first appeared, or are most clearly articulated, in the
criminal law.38
Green thus distinguishes lying from deception by arguing that:
[M]erely misleading is less wrongful than lying because what I call
the principle of caveat auditor, or “listener beware,” applies to cases
of merely misleading but does not apply to lying. Like the principle
of caveat emptor, which says that a buyer is responsible for assessing
the quality of a purchase before buying, the principle of caveat au-
ditor says that, in certain circumstances, a listener is responsible, or
partly responsible, for ascertaining that a statement is true before
believing it.39
Green’s thesis posits that people are able to make moral distinctions
between these offenses; however, he does not explain how ordinary
people are to make such distinctions. Green seems to conflate com-
mon morality with critical morality in coming to this conclusion. As
the Skilling case demonstrates in the following pages, it is unduly opti-
mistic to suppose that public perceptions of moral wrongfulness are
nuanced enough to separate conduct that is merely risky from that
which is criminal, and the dangers are exacerbated in the context of
corporate criminal conduct due to the infiltration of negative emo-
tions like envy and resentment. The popular perception that CEOs
and senior corporate executives are greedy and arrogant is probably
at the root of the visceral reactions to news reports about alleged acts
of wrongdoing. Given this fact, it is hard to see that common morality
36. These moral norms, according to Green, “are fairly concrete”:
Although there will be significant disagreement over the precise content and ap-
plication of such norms, almost every civilized person will have some rudimentary
understanding that it is morally wrong, at least in certain core cases, to lie, cheat,
steal . . . . Even people who have never had occasion to read a single page of
moral philosophy are capable of making remarkably fine-grained distinctions
about, say, what properly constitutes cheating or stealing.
Id. at 45.
37. “[T]he divergent ways in which the offenses of perjury and fraud treat the require-
ment of deception . . . reflect deep-seated and fine-grained distinctions concerning the
concept of deception that we make in our everyday moral lives.” Id. at 42.
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id. at 78–79.
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will be able to set aside these negative emotions when evaluating con-
duct for white-collar criminal sanctions.
There is danger also from the imprecise and ambiguous nature—
in terms of moral rightness or wrongness—of the conduct at issue in
agency crimes. Given the lack of clarity as to what underlying moral
norm has been violated by a particular alleged crime, and because the
precise complexities are hard to understand, there is likely to be a
great deal of dissonance about moral wrongfulness and culpability.40
As Henry Hart writes:
When a criminal enactment proscribes conduct which is malum in
se, such as murder or manslaughter . . . the moral standards of the
community are available always as a guide in the resolution of its
indeterminacies, and there is a minimum of unfairness when
doubt is resolved against a particular defendant. This guidance is
missing when the proscribed conduct is merely malum prohibitum.41
Frequently, the conduct alleged to be wrong involves accounting
transactions without any evidence about the offender’s expertise in
accountancy. The accounting rules often do not have any moral ele-
ment, and are explained more as coordination devices rather than as
moral guidelines. They are also devices for standardization to facilitate
comparison and in many situations are substitutable without moral
choices being compromised. Aside from the offender’s sense as to the
moral value of adhering to such rules, it is difficult to imagine that
such rules have percolated down into the community to attain the
status of moral norms. This might explain the indifference of share-
holders to alleged wrongdoing by management in relation to account-
ing misstatements as long as there is no negative impact on share
prices.
Moral wrongfulness is essential to criminalization for corporate
agency offenses; otherwise, determinations about culpability rest only
on ex post loss rather than from clear guidelines for behavior ex ante.
As Green acknowledges, “we need to refer to the idea of [moral]
wrongdoing not only in distinguishing among various offenses but
also in deciding which conduct to criminalize in the first place, how
40. This is particularly true with cases like Enron where complicated financial transac-
tions were at issue. It is hard to imagine that the average person is able to appreciate the
intricacies of the accounting treatment concerning the Enron Special Purpose Entities
(“SPEs”) and the rules relating to off-balance sheet treatment with regard to the three
percent at-risk rule. If the relevant actor believed the SPEs did not have to be consolidated
based on expert advice, where is the moral wrongfulness in the conduct? Besides, are ac-
counting rules moral norms?
41. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401,
420 (1958).
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offense elements should be defined, and what defenses should be
available.”42 He claims that “without a clearer understanding of the
relationship between morality and white-collar criminal law, the re-
tributive principles on which the criminal law is founded are placed in
serious jeopardy.”43
With regard to regulatory offenses, Green does not contend it is
wrong for the state to criminalize conduct that is not morally wrong-
ful. He argues that “if violating such a regulatory statute constitutes
rule-breaking intended to obtain an unfair advantage over another
with whom one is in a cooperative, rule-bound relationship,” then the
violation constitutes the moral wrong of cheating.44 Giving the exam-
ple of insider trading, he writes it is wrongful because it is essentially
cheating, because the trader “(1) violates the [Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC)] rule that one must either disclose material non-
public information or abstain from trading; and does so (2) with the
intent to obtain an advantage over a second party with whom she is in
a cooperative, rule-governed relationship.”45 The basis of the abstain-
or-disclose rule appears to be that investors must have confidence the
game is being played fairly, and that it is unfair for some traders, who
have privileged access to information, to make money off of that infor-
mation. This is not as clear as Green would like to believe because
there is a body of scholarship contending that insider trading is actu-
ally beneficial to the market because it unearths vital information.46
Buyers predisposed to purchase shares in a company at the prevailing
42. GREEN, supra note 22, at 42.
43. Id. at 4. Professor Seigel argues in the same vein:
One of the foundational principles of the American criminal-justice system is that
punishment is only appropriate if a person acts voluntarily (actus reus) and with
some level of intention (mens rea) . . . . The reasons for this principle stem from
the two traditional purposes of punishment: retribution and deterrence. Retribu-
tion is the deontological notion that a person who commits a crime deserves to be
punished. The converse of this proposition—employing retribution as a limiting
principle—is equally true. A person who fails to act voluntarily (such as by way of
reflex or subject to duress) simply should not be punished.
Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related Offenses, 2006
WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1569 (2006).
44. GREEN, supra note 22, at 250. However, he qualifies this by writing that “harmful-
ness without wrongfulness is not supposed to be enough to satisfy the retributive demands
of the criminal law. In the absence of a persuasive argument that lawbreaking per se entails
some independent form of moral wrongfulness,” he doubts that “criminalization can be
justified.” Id. at 254.
45. Id. at 240.
46. See, e.g., HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (argu-
ing that insider trading has little or no effect on stockholders, and that insiders are entitled
to any gains as a result of their status).
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market price might be able to buy at a lower price because of the
actions of insiders. Further, it is unlikely that the person who is
purchasing the securities from the insider is being taken advantage of
in every situation. It is possible that the buyer sold the securities
before the information surfaced and caused the stock price to fall. In
this case, the buyer is profiting rather than being taken advantage of
as Green contends. If it is assumed that the argument is that the entire
market is being taken advantage of, even that does not suffice as a
strong case for criminalization because in many cases the size of the
sale of the securities by the insider might be small in relation to the
market for securities of the relevant company, with the result that the
consequences are de minimis. Further, the chief complaint of non-in-
siders is that they did not have the opportunity to cash in on the non-
public information, not that they were cheated.47 If they had been
able to cash in, there would have been no complaint. This, again, illus-
trates the moral ambiguity of the alleged wrong.
Moreover, moral wrongfulness is not an automatic justification
for criminalization: several morally wrongful acts might cause no
harm in many circumstances involving consent. This is why the state
refuses to criminalize such acts in situations involving consensual ex-
changes. Some scholars like Henry Hart have argued that criminaliza-
tion should be reserved for conduct that is “intrinsically wrongful.”48
Similarly, Sanford Kadish has criticized the tendency to criminalize
“aggressive business behavior,” claiming the “stigma of moral repre-
hensibility does not naturally associate itself with the regulated con-
duct” in such cases.49 This “impair[s] the identity of the criminal
sanction and its ultimate effectiveness as a preventive sanction, both in
the area of economic crimes and in the areas of its traditional applica-
tion.”50 The fact that our perceptions about morality are capable of
temporal change and that conduct regarded as morally wrongful or
harmful during a certain timeframe might be regarded as perfectly
acceptable in another timeframe must give us further pause for
thought when we see the temptation to criminalize.51
47. See, e.g., Todd A. Bauman, Comment, Insider Trading at Common Law, 51 U. CHI. L.
REV. 838, 847–55 (1984) (for a thorough outline of what is sometimes referred to as the
“equal opportunity” argument against insider trading).
48. Hart, supra note 41, at 417.
49. Sanford H. Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing
Economic Regulations, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 423, 425–26 (1963).
50. Id. at 444.
51. See Harry V. Ball & Lawrence M. Friedman, The Use of Criminal Sanctions in the
Enforcement of Economic Legislation: A Sociological View, 17 STAN. L. REV. 197, 220–21 (1965).
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B. Harm Distinguished
The horror stories of families being deprived of their savings by
the actions of corporate executives have shattered the myth that white
collar crime is victimless.52 In some cases, it has been alleged that en-
tire cities are victims of corporate criminal conduct.53 The purported
economic costs imposed by white-collar criminal behavior also have
been cited as a reason for adopting a hard line against offenders.54
Given the harm caused by white-collar criminals, some believe the
privileged treatment accorded to them erodes the deterrent power of
the criminal law because it signals that society treats criminals from
rich backgrounds differently than those from poorer ones. Some pros-
ecutors complain that judges are more sympathetic to pleas by corpo-
rate defendants to reduce or avoid incarceration, and that this affects
their decisions to bring such offenses to trial.55 It is also claimed that
this is particularly lamentable because the deterrent objectives of the
criminal law are particularly well suited to effective application against
corporate defendants because they are usually educated and commit
their crimes after rational thought.56 All of these concerns have coa-
52. See U.S. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at 10 (statement of Janice Farmer) (“They
took more than my money and my dream. They destroyed my pride in my whole career. I
am totally ashamed that I worked for Enron.”); id. at 22 (statement of Bradley W. Skolnik,
Ind. Securities Comm’r, and Chairman, Enforcement Sec., N. Am. Secs. Adm’rs Ass’n,
Inc.) (“[W]hite collar crimes aren’t victimless crimes. Just like street crime, securities fraud
ruins lives, destroys families, steals hopes, and kills dreams.”).
53. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 128 (“I want to talk a little bit
about . . . other victims, Your Honor. Vendors who sold their goods and services to Enron
suffered. Other businesses who relied on Enron suffered. Local economies where Enron
did business suffered. Houston as a community was particularly hit hard by what happened at
Enron.”).
54. One expert stated that the economic value of securities fraud alone is at about $40
billion, compared with $10 billion for street crime. See U.S. Senate Hearings, supra note 4, at
122 (testimony of Glen B. Gainer, III).
55. Id. at 19 (statement of Hon. James B. Comey, Jr., U.S. Att’y, S.D.N.Y.) (“[Federal
judges] work to eliminate or reduce that jail time because of the defendant’s civic work or
charitable work or his great employment record or his big family or his health problems, or
a whole host of factors that the Guidelines say are discouraged . . . .”).
56. Id. (“White collar offenders are . . . more sophisticated than most criminals. They
commit their crimes not in a fit of passion or out of addiction or a craving, but with cold
and careful calculation. They are, in my experience, the most rational of offenders and are
more likely to weigh the risks against the anticipated rewards of committing a crime.”); see
also id. at 176 (statement of Hon. Jeff Sessions, U.S. Sen. from Ala.) (“I was a United States
Attorney during the Savings and Loan fraud cases. I prosecuted Federal land bank fraud
cases. My office prosecuted those cases that I supervised, and I am going to tell you there is
a lot better behavior in banking today because people went to jail over those cases in the
past. They lost everything they had, their families were embarrassed, and a lot of people
started checking to make sure they were doing their banking correctly.”).
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lesced to create a growing public opinion that corporate wrongdoers
must be equated with ordinary criminals and that incarceration is
necessary.57
To some theorists, the prevention of harm is a sufficient basis for
criminalization; it is permissible to criminalize harmful white-collar
conduct even if it is not morally wrongful. It is not necessary that the
act should have also offended a moral wrong, rather it suffices that the
offender violated a legal ban. Joel Feinberg’s harm principle, for ex-
ample, provides that:
[I]t is legitimate for the state to prohibit conduct that causes seri-
ous private harm, or the unreasonable risk of such harm, or harm
to important public institutions and practices. In short, state inter-
ference with a citizen’s behavior tends to be morally justified when
it is reasonably necessary . . . to prevent harm or the unreasonable
risk of harm to parties other than the person interfered with.58
It is important to understand what constitutes harm. As is typi-
cally used in the criminal law, “criminal harm” can involve bodily
harm59 as well as social harm involving collective losses.60 The first
kind is unproblematic, and the validity of the state’s criminalization of
such conduct is not seriously disputed. The second might also be ac-
ceptable in cases where the harm is non-consensual and involves third
parties suffering without the ability to avoid the harm. However, no
such necessity exists in situations involving agency problems, as the
principals have tools at their disposal to control the wrongdoers.
There are perfectly adequate civil and social sanctions that can
achieve the objectives—incapacitation, retribution, and deterrence—
at much lower cost. Principals can act in concert, use regulators like
the SEC, or act through intermediaries like stock exchanges and insti-
tutional shareholders to do any of these without the state incurring
imprisonment expenses.
57. Id. at 20 (statement of Glen B. Gainer, III, W. Va. State Auditor, and Chairman,
Nat’l White Collar Crime Ctr.) (“Our research section has found through our last nation-
wide study that most Americans view economic crime, or what we would consider white
collar crime, to be every bit as important and deserve equal time and prosecution as tradi-
tional street crime . . . .”).
58. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 11
(1984).
59. See Robert W. Drane & David J. Neal, On Moral Justifications for the Tort/Crime Dis-
tinction, 68 CAL. L. REV. 398, 409–10 (1980) (considering the individual’s relatively greater
psychological fear of suffering bodily harm versus harm to her property).
60. See FEINBERG, supra note 58, at 221–32 (defining collective harms as harms to the
public interest, such as economic disasters, inability to provide public services, and envi-
ronmental pollution).
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Corporate governance crimes involve harm, and some even in-
volve harm on a massive scale such as that caused by the bankruptcy of
Enron. However, this harm is the price of capitalism and there are
other mechanisms that can tackle it more efficiently than imprison-
ment. For conduct without the taint of moral wrongfulness, but where
non-consensual harm results, criminalization without incarceration is
the second-best alternative to decriminalization.
Removing incarceration from the table also separates blamewor-
thiness from punishment. The state possesses advantages in determin-
ing blame, but its advantages in terms of punishing white-collar
offenders are less clear. If the high cost of incarcerating non-violent
offenders outweighs the cost of other kinds of punishment, without
corresponding benefits, scaling back the state monopoly on punish-
ment to areas where it enjoys advantages might be advisable.
Decoupling blame from punishment also recognizes the reality that
conviction alone is sufficient punishment. Assuming further punish-
ment is necessary, state punishment could be restricted to fines and
impediments to holding positions of trust.61
III. Conviction as a Sanction: Theoretical Underpinnings
A. Deterrence
This Part explores the theoretical justifications for the deterrence
value of conviction for white-collar wrongs by comparing and contrast-
ing it with the deterrent value of imprisonment. The most frequently
advanced justification for criminalization is deterrence—offenders
will be deterred from committing criminal acts if the benefits from
committing those acts do not exceed the probability of being caught
multiplied by the cost of punishment following prosecution.62 Thus, a
rational actor will trade off the expected value of committing the
criminal act against two variables: the probability of being caught and
the punishment after conviction. If the probability of being caught is
low, the criminal act might still seem attractive even if the punishment
is high. The same principle applies if the punishment is low and the
probability of being caught is high. These two variables are a function
61. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON.
169, 193 (1968) (“[P]robation and institutionalization use up social resources, and fines do
not, since the latter are basically just transfer payments, while the former use resources in
the form of guards, supervisory personnel, probation officers, and the offenders’ own
time.”).
62. See generally id.; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 10; Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory
of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193 (1985); Shavell, supra note 10.
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both of the resources that the state possesses and of determinations as
to their optimal allocation.
This vein of scholarship draws on work by Gary Becker, whose
economics-based approach showed that stringent fines were prefera-
ble to imprisonment.63 Subsequent work building on this theory has
important implications for this Article’s thesis. In an important article
calculating the disutility of imprisonment, A. Mitchell Polinsky and
Steven Shavell posit there are three kinds of offenders: risk-neutral
(offenders for whom the severity and probability of imprisonment has
equal deterrent value), risk-averse (offenders for whom severity of im-
prisonment has greater deterrent value than probability of imprison-
ment), and risk-preferring (those for whom the severity of
imprisonment has less deterrent value than the probability of impris-
onment).64 Whereas the Polinsky and Shavell study focused on the
disutility of imprisonment, this Article builds on that study and fo-
cuses on the disutility of conviction rather than the disutility of impris-
onment. This allows an understanding of how the removal of
imprisonment as punishment might affect a rational offender’s calcu-
lation. It also facilitates an analysis of the tradeoffs between the rele-
vant variables by slicing the salami even finer than Polinsky and
Shavell’s study does.
To start this analysis, the probability of conviction is p, the length
of imprisonment is l, and the total disutility is u. Total disutility is
made up of disutility of conviction c and disutility of imprisonment i.
Although other factors like age and social situation can be significant
variables in calculating total disutility, for simplicity those factors are
excluded, and the calculation is u = p x [(l x i) + c]. Individuals with a
high value for c are reputation conscious and those with a low value
for c are reputation indifferent. Consider the following scenario: the
probability of conviction is 10%, the disutility of conviction is 200, the
disutility of any sentence length is 5, and the sentence is 10 years.
Then total disutility is .1 x [(5 x 10) + 200] = 25. Now, since the disutil-
ity of any sentence length is constant, increasing the sentence to 20
63. Becker, supra note 61.
64. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of Imprison-
ment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–7 (1999) (“If the disutility from
imprisonment rises in proportion to sentence length, then an increase in the magnitude of
sanctions has the same effect as an equal percentage increase in the probability of sanc-
tions. However, if disutility rises more than in proportion to the sentence, raising the mag-
nitude of sanctions has a greater effect than increasing their probability by the same
percentage amount. Conversely, if disutility rises less than in proportion to the sentence,
raising the magnitude of sanctions has a smaller effect than increasing their probability.”).
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years will increase the total disutility to 0.1 x [(5 x 20) + 200] = 30. If,
however, the disutility of any sentence length is 0, then total disutility
is 0.1 x [(0 x 10) + 200] = 20. In this case, increasing the sentence
length to 20 does not alter the total disutility at all (0.1 x [(0 x 20) +
200] = 20) It is unlikely that the disutility of any sentence length is 0
for any rational individual; it is possible that the disutility of year 1 is
very low at 1 (u = 0.1 x [(1 x 10) + 200] = 21), and thereafter declines
in some proportion to sentence length to a point where the utility of a
life sentence might move into positive territory.65 To explain, if an
individual is sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years at the age of 55,
while the disutility of the first year is likely to be very high, this de-
clines as the person ages because the alternative of being released at
an old age without any prospect of an income or caregivers might be
more unpalatable than staying in jail. Similarly, if the sentence is life
imprisonment, each year after the first might become more bearable,
to the point where it might be preferable to die in jail.
Now, consider the case of reputation-indifferent individuals with
no disutility for conviction alone. Probability of conviction is 10%, dis-
utility of conviction is 0, disutility of any sentence length is 5, and the
sentence is 10 years. Now, total disutility is 0.1 x [(5 x 10) + 0] = 5.
Increasing the sentence length to 20 years results in a total disutility of
0.1 x [(5 x 20) + 0] = 10, doubling with the doubling of sentence
length. This has startling implications. It shows that for the state to
achieve the same disutility for this individual as the offender with the
disutility of conviction of 200 and no disutility of imprisonment, the
state must imprison him for 40 years. Conversely, the offender with
the disutility of 200 on conviction but no disutility on imprisonment
can be deterred to the same extent even by saving money on prison
costs for 40 years. Thus, sending both individuals to jail for identical
amounts is a significant waste of money and fails to capture the savings
offered by the disutility experienced by conviction alone.
65. Professors Robinson and Darley quote Kahneman to make a similar point:
[T]he well being of prison inmates is likely to improve in the course of their
sentence, as they gain seniority and survival skills. . . . Suppose . . . that prisoners
apply a Peak and End rule in retrospective evaluations of their prison experience.
The result would be a global evaluation that becomes steadily less aversive with
time in prison, implying a negative correlation between sentence length and the
deterrence of individual recidivism. This is surely not a socially desirable
outcome.
Paul H Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 462 n.19
(1997) (quoting Daniel Kahneman, New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption, 150 J. INST.
& THEORETICAL ECON. 18, 33–34 (1994)).
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Similarly, tweaking the probability of conviction has the following
consequences. Assume that the probability of conviction is 0.025, disu-
tility of conviction is 200, disutility of any sentence length is 0 and
sentence length is 10 years. Total disutility is 0.025 [(0 x 10) + 200] =
5. This means this offender can be deterred to the same extent as the
reputation-indifferent individual who is imprisoned for 10 years with a
disutility of 5, at one-fourth the cost of enforcement without even in-
curring the cost of imprisonment, i.e., by conviction alone. Thus, it is
a waste of money to spend the same amount on enforcement for both
types of offenders.
The above clearly demonstrates the benefits of focusing on the
quality of individuals and their disutility of conviction. By taking ad-
vantage of this characteristic, a policy can achieve the same deterrence
at lower prison cost and lower enforcement cost. White-collar
criminals are more likely to be reputation conscious and have a high
rate of disutility for conviction alone. This is because their very liveli-
hood is tied to reputation. One study found that “[f]or all the
crimes . . . examined, ranging from insider trading to drug offenses to
bank larceny, it is not uncommon to find that the highest income
criminals suffer reductions in legitimate income of between eighty
and ninety-five percent as a result of conviction.”66 If earning capacity
is destroyed or substantially diminished, the conviction itself would
satisfy the punishment function. It serves to convey information to so-
ciety about the wrongdoer’s unsuitability to hold responsible corpo-
rate positions involving trust. To the extent that further deterrence is
needed, conviction could be combined with other impediments to en-
sure that the offender does not have access to opportunities for re-
offending.67 Conviction also triggers consequential sanctions, such as
66. John R. Lott, Jr., Comment, Optimal Penalties Versus Minimizing the Level of Crime:
Does it Matter Who is Correct?, 71 B.U. L. REV. 439, 442 (1991) (“Collateral penalties imposed
upon criminals, including the loss of licenses and the loss of legitimate income after re-
turning to the work force, are significantly more important for white collar criminals than
for poor criminals even assuming they have committed the same crime.”).
67. See SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 1994). The trial court held that the defend-
ants had committed securities fraud, enjoined them from acting as officers and directors of
any public company, and ordered them to disgorge money. Id. at 520–21. On appeal, the
court affirmed stating the court’s conclusion that the officer and director bar was necessary
to protect public investors:
The Posners seem to be shocked by what they see as the draconian remedy of
eternal boardroom banishment. We intend our affirmance of Judge Pollack’s
judgment in this respect as a sharp warning to those who violate the securities
laws that they face precisely such banishment. Of course, as the SEC points out,
such bar orders are imposed routinely by consent decree.
Id. at 522.
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shaming, by emboldening third parties to enforce social norms on
offenders.68
Given the high profile of the offenders, the information about
conviction is likely to be widely disseminated, ensuring that the rele-
vant target group perceives the consequences of offending. Since the
number of actual and potential wrongdoers subject to these prosecu-
tions is relatively small (these crimes can only be committed by corpo-
rate fiduciaries), saturating the relevant constituency with deterrent
information is feasible and ensures that search costs are not signifi-
cant. Had the pool of corporate fiduciaries been large, corporations
would have had to expend significant resources to detect prior offend-
ers and ensure they were not given further opportunities to offend.
This is not the case. In addition, executive search firms and other
gatekeepers like professional licensing agencies already perform the
detection function.
In sum, monetizing the disutility suffered by the white-collar
criminal upon conviction offers clarity about the sufficiency of the
punishment function served by conviction alone. It also allows for
more efficient use of state resources; the cost of imprisonment might
be more effectively utilized on those who cannot be deterred by the
disutility of conviction alone because they have little to lose. Further,
the ability to deter without the cost of imprisonment eliminates the
social disutility caused by constantly ratcheting up sentences.69 It also
frees courts from making fine distinctions about appropriate sentence
length, with the risk of a jail term being something of a lottery based
on the dispositions of judges.70
68. Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection of Crime
May Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355, 360 (2007) (“Criminal conviction is
clearly relevant for both willing stigmatizers and unwilling stigmatizers. The willing stigma-
tizers use conviction as a proxy for identifying offenders even if their real intended targets
are offenders rather than those who have been convicted and punished. In contrast, un-
willing stigmatizers do not use stigmatization merely as a proxy; their primary targets are
those who have been publicly identified and labeled as offenders—that is, the
stigmatized.”).
69. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 10, at 14 (“[I]ncreasing penalties to prevent crime
imposes costs on society in the forms of the mistaken punishment of innocent people,
deterrence of beneficial but marginally lawful activity, and destruction of marginal incen-
tives for good behavior.”).
70. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from Cur-
rent White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 211–14 (2004).
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B. Retribution
Criminalization of white-collar offenders is often motivated by a
retributive impulse. This Article does not undertake an exhaustive re-
view of the literature on retribution or suggest that retribution should
not be a factor in determinations about the need for criminal sanc-
tions. The limited claim is that the retributive objective is satisfied by
conviction alone given the unique position of white-collar offenders.
As discussed previously, these offenders value group membership,
which is often tied directly to their earning capacity. Conviction fre-
quently extinguishes such membership and rings the death knell for a
professional career.71 For example, if the offender is a lawyer, he may
lose his license.72 He may also be suspended from practicing before
the SEC.73 If she is a CEO of the company she founded, she must
demit that office.74 Following the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
under section 1105, the SEC has the power without going to court to
issue officer and director bars as part of a cease-and-desist proceed-
ing.75 The standard for a bar is unfitness.76 Caution is necessary in
exercising the barring power—it must be confined to limited time pe-
riods rather than lifetime bars unless there are strong reasons to im-
pose the latter. The inherent limitations of any system of predicting
future behavior, even taking account of prior misconduct, will ensure
that some CEOs will be falsely predicted to have the potential for re-
offending and will receive unnecessarily long bar orders. These indi-
viduals will experience undeserved hardship and there will be a net
71. Id. at 213.
72. See, e.g., MODEL FEDERAL RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT R. I (1991); RULES
OF PROCEDURE OF THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA R. 602 (2010).
73. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (2006). Sec-
tion 15(b)(4) authorizes the SEC to “censure, place limitations on the activities, functions,
or operations of, suspend for a period not exceeding twelve months, or revoke the registra-
tion of any broker or dealer” if, among other things, the broker or dealer has (1) willfully
made or caused to be made false material statements in any proceeding before the SEC
with respect to registration; (2) willfully violated any provisions of the Securities Act or the
Exchange Act, among others; or (3) willfully aided and abetted the same. Id.
§§ 15(b)(4)(A), (D), (E); see also Touche Ross Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979)
(noting SEC can censure and suspend individuals from practicing before it).
74. One example is Martha Stewart. Under the terms of her settlement with the SEC
for insider trading, Stewart was forbidden from serving as a company executive or director
of any public company for five years. Landon Thomas, Jr., Stewart Deal Resolves Stock Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2006, at C1. SEC regulations bar any unfit person from serving in an
executive position in a publicly held company. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 305, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u(d)(2) (2006).
75. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1105, 15 U.S.C. § 78u–3(f) (2006).
76. Id.
480 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
loss of social welfare. Yet others will be falsely predicted to be at a low
risk of re-offending and will receive short term bars. Such individuals
might re-offend and create new victims. Since this category is more
likely to be the focus of attention, it might explain the view that white-
collar offenders also have a significant rate of recidivism.77
To conclude, the principal objectives of criminalization are to
prevent white-collar offenders from committing similar offenses and
to deter others from committing offenses. The first objective can be
achieved by disqualifying the offender from holding responsible of-
fice, and the second can be achieved by conviction without imprison-
ment aided by consequential sanctions.78 A third objective is to ensure
that the offender does not retain the fruits of his misconduct. This can
be achieved by an order to disgorge and by taking back ill-gotten
gains. Incarceration does not aid any of these purposes. To the extent
that retribution is an objective, and is not satisfied by the above sanc-
tions, consequential sanctions that inevitably follow conviction ought
to suffice in any civilized society. This has the added advantage of de-
centralizing the retributive objective and allowing non-state actors to
impose punishment.
IV. Consequential Sanctions
Conviction inevitably results in consequential sanctions ranging
from shame to legal impediments and denial of privileges. As has
been previously argued, this is a significant burden for white-collar
offenders and contributes to their high disutility of conviction alone.
If, as can be accepted, one of the objectives of criminalization is to
socialize offenders and society at large, the shaming element that inev-
itably accompanies criminal conviction might meet that objective
without the need for incarceration.79 The law could stop at conviction
without imposing any punishment because the shame might offer suf-
ficient deterrence and retributive advantages.80 The shame of convic-
tion might alone serve as a sufficient punishment and incarceration
77. See Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules: Finding and
Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 19, 61–62 (2003).
78. Robinson & Darley, supra note 65, at 471–77 (stating that law can play a role in
socialization).
79. See generally Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39
J.L. & ECON. 519 (1996).
80. See id. at 532 (arguing that the penalty might equal zero in the absence of a trial or
when only probation results but, even without a sentence, arrest and conviction alone gen-
erate stigma).
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would be a waste of resources.81 Corporate governance offenders are
likely to experience significant detriment in terms of loss of employ-
ment opportunities and social exclusion and might internalize the val-
ues sought to be conveyed by the law even without going to jail.82
Consequential sanctions, which can include shaming, withholding of
esteem, shunning, and negative voting by investors and other market
participants, can also modify behavior in desirable ways.83 Shame-en-
forcers frequently seek to attach negative labels to an offender,84 cre-
ate the offender’s reputation as a bad actor,85 label actors as being
disloyal to shareholders’ interests, exclude those actors from other
employment involving trust,86 cause economic harm to offenders by
seeking disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and deprive offenders of any
opportunity to hold prestigious positions.87 These actions are ulti-
mately aimed at norm-internalization by the offender and observers.
81. Id. at 534.
82. Id. at 537. Some are only satisfied by imprisonment. See 148 CONG. REC. 12,642
(daily ed. July 11, 2002) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“[S]omebody ought to go to jail, and
the doors should be locked and the keys thrown away. Throw away the keys. It really would
not be too severe a punishment for some of these four-flushers.”).
83. Studies also show that the ability to express punishment has important implica-
tions for cooperative behavior. Astrid Hopfensitz & Ernesto Reuben, The Importance of Emo-
tions for the Effectiveness of Social Punishment 19 (Tinbergen Institute, Discussion Paper No.
05-075/1, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=775524 (“[I]ndividuals who are will-
ing to punish are also willing to keep on cooperating. This guaranties that, as long as these
individuals have the opportunity to punish, cooperation can be sustained. Furthermore
this kind of individuals [sic] might help cooperation emerge, even if it was initially rare. In
addition, the same type of people is necessary to support punishment in the presence of
retaliation. If retaliation deters individuals from using the punishment mechanism, coop-
eration can unravel.”).
84. See 148 CONG. REC. 12,642 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (“The
President apparently is so miffed with these corporate ‘wrongdoers’ that he has elevated
them in his rhetoric to a bad-guy level that is almost, but not quite as bad, as al-Qaeda’s
‘evildoers.’ Almost the same level: perhaps not quite.”).
85. SEC v. First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Sands, a sophisti-
cated businessman and a lawyer, has engaged in numerous activities in violation of the
securities laws and basic notions of right and wrong. . . . We need not sort out whether his
principles are just plain wrong, or whether he is afflicted with akrasia . . . .”).
86. See Troy Wolverton, AFL-CIO’s Throw-the-Bum-Out Call Gets Cool Reception, THES-
TREET.COM, Sept. 26, 2003, http://www.thestreet.com/stocks/troywolverton/10116076.
html (describing a call by the AFL-CIO for Kenneth Langone, a director of the NYSE
board who defended Richard Grasso’s compensation package, to be dropped from the
board of GE and four other public companies).
87. In First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d at 1194, the defendant argued the bar against him
holding office as director was against the public interest because it would prevent him
from serving on the boards of charities. The court responded thus:
Perhaps he is right that charities will not want to place him in positions of high
visibility and prestige. If so, and if Sands does have a genuine interest in doing
charitable works, we are certain that he can continue his charitable involvement
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Norm-internalization for white-collar offenders is enabled by the
significant detriment in terms of loss of employment opportunities
and social exclusion experienced. A variant of this idea is captured by
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, who calls it preference-shaping.88 Dau-
Schmidt writes:
Preference shaping, on an individual, organizational, and societal
level, is an important human endeavor. It has been identified as a
primary or secondary goal of childrearing, education, religion, ad-
vertising, public service announcements, legislation, and . . . crimi-
nal punishment. . . . [It is essential] that the person or group of
people who are endeavoring to affect another’s preferences have
some legitimate claim to authority over the person, or at least have
the confidence of the person.89
CEOs are particularly suited for desirable behavior modification
through the operation of social sanctions because of this very fea-
ture—their dependence on approval from diverse constituencies and
the value placed on reputation.90
Shaming has salience for corporate governance offenders be-
cause of their dependence on group membership. The targets of
shaming are members of professional associations who possess li-
censes that allow them to carry on certain kinds of economic activity.
Frequently, these professional licenses and certifications are privileges
that can be taken away by the relevant authority.91 Such legal impedi-
in a less prestigious, but just as worthy, capacity. We touch on this argument be-
cause it underscores the purblindness of Sands . . . .
Id. at 1194.
88. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 10, at 14–15 (“If peoples’ preferences are compatible, no
one’s preferences will be frustrated, and there will be no need to expend resources on
precautionary measures.”).
89. Id. at 17. See also id. at 18 (“By characterizing a behavior as good or bad rather
than just inexpensive or expensive, the authority figure indicates need for a fundamental
change in the basis upon which the affected person makes decisions.”).
90. See Sandeep Gopalan, Changing Social Norms and CEO Pay: The Role of Norms Entre-
preneurs, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 1 (2007).
91. The Ninth Circuit explained:
The district court has broad equitable powers to fashion appropriate relief for
violations of the federal securities laws, which include the power to order an of-
ficer and director bar. In addition to the court’s inherent equitable powers, the
Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (Reme-
dies Act) authorizes the court to order an officer and director bar “if the person’s
conduct demonstrates substantial unfitness to serve as an officer or director. ” In
determining whether to order the bar, a court may consider: “(1) the ‘egregious-
ness’ of the underlying securities law violation; (2) the defendant’s ‘repeat of-
fender’ status; (3) the defendant’s ‘role’ or position when he engaged in the
fraud; (4) the defendant’s degree of scienter; (5) the defendant’s economic stake
in the violation; and (6) the likelihood that misconduct will recur.”
First Pac. Bancorp, 142 F.3d at 1193 (citations omitted).
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ments to the offender holding offices involving trust can be finely cali-
brated to achieve incapacitation in much the same way that jail does.92
Even if impediments are not imposed, it is unlikely the individual will
be able to find similar employment following conviction. Prestige
goods are also likely to be denied in non-professional contexts be-
cause these offenders are also members of social groups which view
conviction with distaste.93 Membership conditions and interactions af-
ter admittance present ideal conditions for deploying shaming as es-
teem is vital for profitable interactions.94 Even if some offenders are
not affected by shaming, other observers might see the disutility of the
alleged offense and modify their behavior.95 Membership in these
groups is intrinsically related to the possession of a good reputation,
and the gate-keeping function served by these groups might obviate
the need for incarceration by delivering the same behavioral
change.96
White-collar offenders have a variety of agents who can impose
shaming and other social sanctions including investors, other direc-
tors, employees, the media, politicians, and potential employers.
Their position relative to the offender reduces the risk of retaliation
by the offender and facilitates internalization.97 Indeed, certain
shamers, such as the courts, are completely immune from retalia-
92. See SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 142 (1995) (discussing the court’s discretion to bar
service of an officer or director conditionally or unconditionally for a limited amount of
time or permanently).
93. See, e.g., Rasmusen, supra note 79, at 521 (noting “people [may] feel moral repug-
nance for criminals and choose to incur personal costs rather than interact with them”).
94. Jonathan Macey, Delaware: Home of the World’s Most Expensive Raincoat, 33 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2005) (“[Directors] do not like to be made the object of public scorn
and ridicule.”).
95. Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 639
(1996). Professor Kahan argues that shaming has the effect of shaping preferences. If indi-
viduals are shamed for contravening a particular asserted norm, other observers will mod-
ify their own behavior to fit that asserted norm. Id.
96. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and
the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 813 (2001)
(noting media coverage makes directors fear liability even more than they ought).
Langevoort’s “hypothesis is that under certain predictable circumstances, executives will
overestimate the risk of liability. There are a number of possible reasons. One is that news-
papers and business periodicals highlight dramatic instances of such suits, and hence the
threat of liability.” Id. at 823; see also Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, The Corporate Govern-
ance Role of the Media, in THE RIGHT TO TELL: THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN ECONOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT (R. Islam ed., 2002) (writing that corporate executives act appropriately because
they do not want to be portrayed by the media as “the bad guys”).
97. See Hopfensitz & Reuben, supra note 83, at 19 (“If retaliation deters individuals
from using the punishment mechanism, cooperation can unravel.”).
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tion.98 They also possess significant advantages over other shamers.99
First, they have authority conferred by law. Unlike other shamers, the
offender is in a decidedly inferior position to the court at every level.
Second, a court’s findings have certain other positive attributes de-
rived from the legal process. One of these attributes is legitimacy. An-
other is finality. After the appeals process is exhausted, the verdict of
the court is final and any shame that follows cannot be changed.
Shame-targets can respond to shaming with anger and contempt
at the shamers.100 Conviction serves as a focal point for shaming in
that it emboldens individuals to impose social sanctions. Collective
opinion concretizes around the conviction and holds out the offender
as an object of shame. Those who previously were afraid or hesitant to
shame draw strength from the conviction. This is because doubt about
the guilt of the offender is largely removed by the court’s verdict. In-
dignation and anger-based responses by the offender are less likely to
be tolerated following conviction than before. If the focal point cre-
ated by the conviction yields effective follow-up shaming by other ac-
tors, then it serves to reinforce the message and yield sticky norm-
internalization.101
Shaming meshes neatly with the white-collar crime debate be-
cause it addresses the expressive gap in legal sanctions.102 Imprison-
98. See, e.g., In re Memorandum of Decision of Judicial Conference Comm. on Judicial
Conduct and Disability, 517 F.3d 558 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 2008) (holding judges have absolute
immunity from civil liability for their decisions).
99. Certain shamers, like politicians, appear to have little effect on those they seek to
shame. During the Senate Hearings on the PCAOB, Senator Byrd said:
[O]ne finds disconcerting the acute lack of shame—the acute lack of shame—S-
H-A-M-E—on the part of some of these corporate executives. Former Enron CEO
Jeffrey Skilling told the House Energy and Commerce Oversight Subcommittee
that Enron had tight control on financial risk, but that he could not be expected
to oversee everything and “close out the cash drawers . . . every night.” Can you
imagine that kind of statement? I think it was Wordsworth who said: No matter
how high you are in your department, you are responsible for what the lowliest
clerk is doing.
148 CONG. REC. 12,642 (daily ed. July 11, 2002) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
100. Contempt and indignation by the offender are often counterproductive. For ex-
ample, Senator Byrd had this to say about Skilling’s testimony to a House committee: “So
here is an individual who tells a House committee he cannot be expected to oversee every-
thing and close out the cash drawers every night—such a stunning, irresponsible, arrogant
attitude on the part of a chief executive.” Id.
101. See Gopalan, supra note 90, at 22 (noting that “[t]he role of influential individuals
or groups in socializing or selling the norm is the missing link” to proper internalization).
102. Chad Flanders, Shame and the Meanings of Punishment, 55 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 609,
611–12 (2006) (“The law does not exist merely to allocate benefits and burdens; it also says
things through its actions. . . . It is not as if society punishes by inflicting suffering and then
stating in words that it does not approve of the offender’s conduct. Rather, the punish-
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ment and fine sanctions are crude in their application and do not
serve to convey the emotions aroused by the actions of corporate of-
fenders. Frequently, for most indirect, non-dangerous offenses, all
that society wants is that these emotions be ventilated, and for the
offender to be prevented from re-offending rather than to see the of-
fender go to jail or be made to suffer financial loss.
In the Skilling-type case, what is the point of sending the exces-
sively optimistic CEO to jail or imposing a fine? Civilized society recog-
nizes that the CEO’s conduct is not worthy of jail time and that fines
are crude matches for their actions. Any sanction, if it is to be mean-
ingful and reflective of a sophisticated system, must match the mes-
sage that society is trying to convey to the offender and be
proportional to the offense. Imprisoning Skilling for 292 months then
is an inappropriate tool for what society really wants to do. Conviction
ought to suffice because it serves the expressive function of the law
insofar as it tells the offender he has acted in a way that meets with
society’s disapproval and conveys the consequences of such conduct
to other observers. It leaves other consequences to individual mem-
bers to administer.
I have written in previous work about the need for internalization
of the underlying norm if shaming is to work.103 If offenders charged
with violating accounting rules do not believe their conduct was
wrongful, then they are likely to be angered by the imposition of a
shame sanction rather than feel remorse. Even if they change their
actions following the shaming because they realize the disutility cre-
ated, this reformation is unlikely to be sustainable. Resentment and
anger are likely to motivate them to find new ways to break the rules.
This problem could be partially addressed by incapacitating them
from holding similar positions of trust through the use of legal
impediments.
I have also discussed, in previous work,104 the various objections
to shaming and do not restate those arguments here except to address
one objection—the lack of process protections.105 This line of scholar-
ment is the expression of condemnation: Society gives out harsh punishments for serious
crimes because it wants to condemn those crimes in no uncertain terms. This is to say that,
conventionally, hard treatment is society’s way of expressing disapproval of criminal acts.
Words alone are not good enough; the walls of a prison are.”).
103. Gopalan, supra note 90.
104. Sandeep Gopalan, Shame Sanctions and Excessive CEO Pay, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 757
(2007).
105. Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between Privacy and
Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5–12 (1991).
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ship contends that the lack of process might lead to shame sanctions
being imposed on the innocent.106 Further, there is no architecture to
make the amount of shame proportional to the wrong committed by
the offender resulting in over shaming or under shaming. In some
cases, lack of process might inflict too much, irreversible punish-
ment.107 In addition, those undertaking the shaming are not subject
to any accountability mechanisms.108 While these objections have
some merit, they can be overcome to a significant degree here be-
cause shaming is consequent upon a determination of blameworthi-
ness by a court. This determination protects against the political
deployment of shame sanctions. Trade unions and employee groups
might have self-interested reasons to target CEOs. What is criminal
conduct to a left-wing trade union might not be so for many other
market participants and the deployment of shame sanctions based on
political ideologies could be a threat to their efficacy. Similarly, the
media could engage in witch hunts without undertaking significant
effort to establish guilt. If, however, shaming follows conviction or re-
sults from a finding of guilt by a regulatory agency, professional associ-
ation, or stock exchange, then much of the due process problem can
be negated.
V. Skilling’s Case
A. The Case
At the peak of its success, Enron was “The World’s Leading En-
ergy Company” and an iconic symbol of American capitalism.109 In
just the span of a decade, it underwent enormous transformation. By
1990, Enron was primarily a pipeline company with 3000 employees, a
market capitalization of $3 billion, and revenues of about $5 bil-
lion.110 By 1999, it had 18,000 employees, offices in 30 countries, a
market capitalization of $22 billion, and revenues over $40 billion—
106. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1938 (1991).
107. See Tim Eaton, Prosecutor Kills Himself in Texas Raid Over Child Sex, N.Y. TIMES, No-
vember 7, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/07/us/07pedophile.html?
ex=1320555600&en=9a849fc4db0d28ce&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (The suicide of
a prosecutor who allegedly solicited a person he believed to be thirteen years of age follow-
ing a Dateline NBC sting is a sobering reminder of the dangerous consequences.).
108. See James Q. Whitman, What is Wrong with Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 YALE L.J.
1055, 1088 (1998) (worrying that shaming confers too much “enforcement power to a
fickle and uncontrolled general populace”).
109. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 15.
110. Id. at 24.
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almost 90% of which came from Jeff Skilling’s Wholesale business.111
During this period of time, Enron’s shareholders received almost
500% return on their investment.112 This transformation was widely
acclaimed. Amongst its many awards, Enron was lauded as Fortune’s
“Most Innovative Company in America” for four consecutive years.113
All this achievement collapsed in an extraordinary sequence of
events that was said to epitomize corporate corruption at its worst.
Consequences for Enron’s employees and the city of Houston were
drastic. On “Black Monday,” over 4000 Houston Enron employees lost
their jobs.114 Over the course of the following months, thousands
more lost their jobs until the company, once Houston’s largest em-
ployer, had only enough employees to administer the bankruptcy. En-
ron stock plummeted to its nadir, rendering many employees’ 401(k)
accounts worthless. Savings accumulated over lifetimes were rendered
naught. When the trial of Skilling and Enron Chairman and CEO Ken
Lay commenced, it became apparent that several jurors knew some-
one—family, friends, neighbors, co-workers, clients, fellow churchgo-
ers—who was harmed by Enron’s collapse.115 Many jurors had
suffered financial losses to the tune of thousands of dollars.116 In their
responses, several jurors noted “the far reaching impact on the busi-
ness community,” the “extremely negative impact on [Houston’s]
charitable and arts organizations,” and the damage to “Houston[’s]
real estate market.”117
Through 1996, Jeff Skilling headed Enron’s Wholesale business,
which he founded in 1990 as its first and only employee.118 In 1997,
Skilling became Enron’s President and Chief Operating Officer, and
joined the Board of Directors.119 In February 2001, he was appointed
Enron’s CEO.120 On August 14, 2001, in an end to his meteoric ca-
reer, he resigned from the company.121 Skilling was indicted in 2004
along with former Enron Chairman and CEO Ken Lay and former
111. Id.
112. Id. at 25.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 125.
115. Defendants’ Renewed Motion for Change of Venue and Related Relief at 16–18,
United States v. Skilling, Crim. No. H-04-25 (S.D. Tex. Jan 1, 2006).
116. Id. at 18.
117. Id. One juror said: “Was there anyone in Houston not affected in some way?” Id.
118. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, 15.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Enron Chief Accounting Officer Richard Causey.122 On December 28,
2005, just weeks before trial, Causey pled guilty to one count of securi-
ties fraud.123 Skilling and Lay’s trial began in Houston on January 30,
2006.124 On May 25 2006, the jury convicted Skilling on nineteen
counts: one count of conspiracy to commit securities or wire fraud;
twelve counts of securities fraud; five counts of false statements to au-
ditors; and one count of insider trading.125 He was acquitted on nine
counts of insider trading.126 Thereafter, Skilling was sentenced to 292
months in prison and ordered to pay $45 million in restitution.127
Critical to this Article’s argument regarding moral wrongfulness and
harm, Skilling was charged not with causing Enron’s bankruptcy, but
instead misrepresenting Enron’s financial condition from 1999 to
2001.128
Unlike the other bete noire, Enron CFO Andrew Fastow, Skilling
was not accused of stealing from Enron. Further, the trial showed that
Fastow, by his own admission, had concealed his thefts from Skilling.
Given the nature of Skilling’s personality and marriage to Enron’s suc-
cess, there was no case that Skilling had sabotaged the company’s in-
terests to benefit his own. The Enron Task Force, which had been set
up to investigate and bring to justice those who were responsible for
Enron’s collapse did not deny that Skilling “loved the company,” “was
very committed” and “dedicated” to it, and “had the best interests of
Enron in mind.”129
Despite these facts, the indictment alleged that, starting in late
1999, Skilling spearheaded a massive conspiracy to deceive investors
about Enron’s financial health by manipulating the company’s finan-
cial results and lying about the performance of its businesses.130 The
indictment alleged this conspiracy included almost 125 people, from
122. Superseding Indictment, United States v. Causey, No. H-04-25 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7,
2004).
123. Associated Press, Ex-Enron Officer Given 5 1/2 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2006, at C3. Causey has since been sentenced to five and one-half years in prison. Id.
124. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 15.
125. Judgment in a Criminal Case at 1–3, United States v. Skilling, Crim. No. H-04-25
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 25, 2006).
126. Id. at 1.
127. Id. at 4, 7.
128. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 16.
129. Id. at 17.
130. Brief for the United States as Appellee at 10, United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d
529 (5th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-20885). Fastow testified: “[A]t Enron the culture was and the
business practice seemed to consistently be to do transactions that maximized the financial
reporting earnings as opposed to . . . maximizing the true economic value of the transac-
tion.” Id.
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Enron’s senior management to entry-level employees to professionals
at several establishments in the legal, banking, and finance sectors.131
The Task Force contended the conspiracy’s objective had been to
pump up Enron’s stock price artificially by regularly reporting finan-
cial information that met or exceeded Wall Street analysts’ expecta-
tions, trumpeting Enron’s successes, and concealing its failures.132
The indictment alleged that Skilling and his co-conspirators en-
gaged in five areas of fraud. First, by manufacturing earnings and hid-
ing losses through fraudulent transactions involving LJM, a special
purpose entity whose general partner was Enron CFO Andrew Fas-
tow.133 Second, by raiding reserves in one quarter and taking extra
reserves in another in order to report earnings that exceeded or met
with analysts’ expectations.134 Third, by misrepresenting the nature of
the Wholesale business as a “logistics company” that yielded stable,
sustainable earnings, when it was really a risky “trading company”
whose profits depended on speculative bets on energy prices.135 Here,
the government alleged that spin-doctoring Wholesale as a “logistics
company” made a difference to how the market valued it.136 Allegedly,
Skilling was aware of this fact and told Enron Broadband Service
(“EBS”) CEO Ken Rice that the stock would “get whacked” if the fact
that it was a risky trading company was apparent to the market.137 The
government also alleged that Skilling shifted losses from other divi-
sions to Wholesale in order to convey the appearance they were finan-
cially sound, when they were not, so as to attract further investment.138
Fourth, by concealing the failure of the Retail business (Enron
Energy Services (“EES”)) by using a “resegmentation” to shift Retail’s
losses into Wholesale, then stating EES was “firmly on track.”139 EES
was created by Enron to sell natural gas to customers in deregulated
markets. It belied its initial expectations of being profitable and was
struggling financially. The problems were compounded by the distress
131. Gov’t Statement in Compliance with Court’s Order Dated November 2, 2004,
United States v. Skilling, Crim. No. H-04-25 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 19, 2004).
132. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 130, at 33–38.
133. Fastow testified that Skilling told him: “I’ll make sure you’re all right on the pro-
ject. You won’t lose any money.” Id. at 43. Fastow opined that Enron’s failure to disclose
these supposed “guarantees” made its financial statements false. Id.
134. The Task Force argued that reserves were manipulated to hit earnings targets in
three separate quarters: 4Q 1999; 2Q 2000; and 4Q 2000. Id. at 33–39.
135. Id. at 23.
136. Id. at 23–24.
137. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 535 (5th Cir. 2009).
138. Id. at 535.
139. Id. at 537.
490 UNIVERSITY OF SAN FRANCISCO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
faced by Californian utility companies that owed EES substantial
amounts that had already been booked as profits under the mark-to-
market accounting rules.140 When the utilities did not pay up in late
2000, the government alleges that instead of booking several hun-
dreds of millions in losses pursuant to the accounting rules, Skilling
conspired to hide the losses in Wholesale.141 This ensured EES contin-
ued to smell of roses. Similarly, in March 2001, EES’s losses were bur-
ied in Wholesale following the California energy crisis when the
California Public Utilities Commission imposed a surcharge that
could not be passed on to customers.142 This hurt Enron to the tune
of hundreds of millions of dollars.143 Notwithstanding these machina-
tions, EES’s financial condition did not improve and its losses in 2001
alone exceeded $700 million.144
And finally, by concealing the failure of EBS by falsely stating it
was “healthy” and “growing fast.”145 As is evident at first blush, the
statements at issue were remarkably like puffery rather than criminal
fraud.146 In some cases they were bad business decisions based on
hindsight, but were they worthy of imprisonment?147
140. Id. at 535.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The Task Force alleged Skilling concealed the failure of Enron’s relatively new
Retail unit, Enron Energy Services, by moving hundreds of millions in alleged losses from
Retail to Wholesale. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 130, at 12. The Task
Force also claimed Skilling had misled analysts by failing to tell them that the real purpose
of the reorganization was to hide losses, and instead telling them it was done for efficiency
“to get the best . . . hands working risk management.” Id. at 30. Skilling was also told the
accounting and disclosures were appropriate. Id. at 61.
145. The Task Force said Skilling misrepresented the outlook of EBS’s business and
the sources of its revenues. Id. at 31–32.
146. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 98 (“In our Bandwidth Intermedia-
tion Business, we are making excellent progress in creating a commodity market for
bandwidth.”).
147. Skilling’s testimony is revealing:
I’ll make the last one argument for Broadband because people criticize me about
Broadband, and I will take the criticism. We—certainly, we made a mistake. But it
wasn’t big. I mean, it was a billion dollars. We invested a billion dollars in the
Broadband business. If it had worked, it could have been worth $30 billion. It
didn’t work. We lost a billion dollars, but if you can make those kinds of bets,
that’s the kind of the risk you [should be taking] as a corporation. And if you do a
lot of [deals with a] downside of a billion and upside of 30 [billion], you’re doing
a good job for your shareholders in the long run, in my opinion. This one didn’t
work.
Tom Kirkendall, Reacting to Gladwell’s Enron Article, HOUSTON’S CLEAR THINKERS, Jan. 10,
2007, http://blog.kir.com/archives/2007/01/reacting_to_gla_1.asp.
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The government also alleged that Skilling made misrepresenta-
tions to investors during several conference calls.148 The relevant ones
are:
January 22, 2001: Skilling told investors “the situation in California
had little impact on fourth quarter results. Let me repeat that. For
Enron, the situation in California had little impact on fourth quar-
ter results.”149 Further, “nothing can happen in California that
would jeopardize” earnings targets.150 The government claimed
that at the time of these statements, Skilling knew the California
utilities were not in a position to pay Enron and that a loss of hun-
dreds of millions of dollars would have to be booked.151 Allegedly,
at this call, Skilling was a mute bystander when Mark Koenig, En-
ron’s Director of Investor Relations, stated that non-core business
revenues were a “fairly small” amount of EBS’s earnings.152 The
government contends that this was false.153
January 25, 2001: Skilling told Enron’s annual analysts conference
that EES and EBS had “sustainable high earnings power.”154 He
also claimed that Enron was “not a trading business. We are a logis-
tics company.”155
March 23, 2001: Following news on the market that EBS was in dire
straits, and Enron’s falling stock price, Skilling convened a special
conference call with analysts. He claimed EBS was “having a great
quarter,” and Enron was “highly confident” that EES would meet
its earning target.156 The government alleges Skilling knew this was
not true.157
April 17, 2001: Skilling claimed on another conference call that
the transfer of EES’s risk-management books to Wholesale was be-
cause there was “such capability in our wholesale business that were
[sic]—we just weren’t taking advantage of that in managing our
portfolio at the retail side. And this retail portfolio has gotten so
big so fast that we needed to get the best—the best hands working
on risk management there.”158 The government alleges the moti-
vation was to conceal losses. During the call, Skilling also said that
the “first quarter results were great” at EES, despite them being
down, and with regard to EBS, claimed there was a “very strong
development of the marketplace in the commoditization of
148. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 130, at 26–33.
149. Id. at 25.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 26.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 27–28.
157. Id. at 28.
158. Id. at 30.
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bandwidth. . . . [W]e’re feeling very good about the development
of this business.”159
July 17, 2001: Skilling stated EES “had an outstanding second quar-
ter” and was “firmly on track to achieve” its earnings targets, de-
spite EES posting a loss of hundreds of millions of dollars.160 He
again claimed EES’s reorganization was undertaken for efficiency
reasons (not to hide losses as alleged by the government).161
Skilling also allegedly raided Wholesale’s reserve accounts flush
from its profitable second half of 2000, which allowed Enron to put
over $850 million in its own reserves.162 The government contended
the decision to put the funds into reserves was not based on feared
potential liabilities, but rather to use it instrumentally to manipulate
earnings.163 Skilling allegedly used it to hit a specific earnings target
to meet Wall Street expectations.164 The government also argued
Skilling was aware Enron’s SEC filings contained false statements, in-
cluding the recognition of money from a Nigerian barges deal as legit-
imate income despite the fact that it was not really a sale.165 In
addition, it was alleged that Enron misled Arthur Andersen by giving
it management-representation letters knowing them to be false, thus
undermining the auditing process.166 In particular, these representa-
tions claimed that all related party transactions were disclosed when
they were not.167
B. Mens Rea
The prosecution based its case largely on self-serving testimony
provided by witnesses who had everything to gain by pinning blame
on Skilling for what were, at worst, bad business judgments.168 During
the trial, Skilling’s defense was that he did not break any laws, and
159. Id. at 30–31.
160. Id. at 33.
161. Id.
162. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 538 (5th Cir. 2009).
163. Id. at 537–38.
164. Id. at 538.
165. Id. at 540.
166. Id. at 541.
167. Id.
168. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former Enron Chief Financial Officer Andrew
Fastow Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Commit Securities and Wire Fraud, Agrees to Coop-
erate with Enron Investigation (Jan. 14, 2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/
pressrel04/enron011404.htm (“The remaining 96 criminal charges against Fastow from a
May 2003 indictment are pending, and will be dismissed if the government determines that
Fastow has cooperated fully and truthfully.”); see also Kristen Hays, Enron’s Top Accountant
Gets 5 Years, Causey’s Term Is Third-Harshest, but Less Than Time Sought in Plea Deal, HOUS.
CHRON., Nov. 16, 2006, at A1.
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that his actions were undertaken as a loyal employee of Enron.169 He
also claimed he had always relied on competent legal and accounting
advice.170 With regard to the statements made during the calls to ana-
lysts, Skilling claimed these were immaterial. Most importantly, Skill-
ing attacked the reliability of the government’s key witnesses—
Andrew Fastow and Ben Glisan. Fastow’s testimony is the most prob-
lematic. Fastow claimed that he and Skilling had a shared understand-
ing about Cuiaba171 and the Nigerian barges, which Fastow referred to
as “bear hugs.”172 Skilling contended these were misinterpretations
made by Fastow.173
“In May 2006, the jury found Skilling guilty of nineteen counts:
one count of conspiracy,174 twelve counts of securities fraud,175 five
counts of making false statements,176 and one count of insider trad-
169. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 3.
170. Id. at 9.
171. Skilling, 554 F.3d at 542.
172. Id. at 542.
173. Id. He also attacked the “Global Galactic” list kept by Fastow. Id.
174. The conspiracy counts required that the defendants:
[K]nowingly and intentionally conspire (1) to willfully and unlawfully use and
employ manipulative and deceptive contrivances and directly and indirectly (i) to
employ devices, schemes and artifices to defraud; (ii) to make untrue statements
of material fact and omit to state facts necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, no mislead-
ing; and (iii) to act or engage in acts, practices, and courses of conduct which
would and did operate as a fraud and deceit upon members of the investing pub-
lic . . . .
Superseding Indictment at 36, United States v. Causey, No. H-04-25 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7,
2004).
175. The securities fraud count required that the defendants:
[W]illfully and unlawfully use and employ manipulative and deceptive contriv-
ances and directly and indirectly (i) employ devices, schemes and artifices to de-
fraud; (ii) make untrue statements of material fact and omit to state facts
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, no misleading; and (iii) engage in acts, practices,
and courses of conduct which would and did operate as a fraud and deceit upon
members of the investing public in connection with purchases and sales of Enron
securities and by the use of the instruments of communication in the course of
interstate commerce and the mails.
Id. at 40.
176. This count required that the defendants:
[K]nowingly and wilfully made and caused to be made materially false and mis-
leading statements, and [had] omitted to state material facts necessary in order to
make the statements made . . . no misleading, to accountants retained by Enron
. . . in connection with the audit and examination of financial statements of En-
ron as required by law to be made, and the preparation and filing of documents
. . . required to be filed with the SEC . . . .
Id. at 50.
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ing.”177 Skilling won a minor victory by being acquitted of nine counts
of insider trading.178 Ken Lay also met a harsh fate and was convicted
of every count against him.179 The district court sentenced Skilling to
spend 292 months in imprisonment, three years under supervised re-
lease, and to pay $45 million in restitution.
C. Overzealous Prosecution?
As is apparent, the sheer size of a company like Enron necessi-
tates the creation of large sub-structures comprising several layers of
subordinates, governance systems, and internal and outside advisors
to ensure the proper structuring and vetting of business transactions
and decisions. It is to these substructures that CEOs and senior execu-
tives turn for most of the decisions they are required to make. They
act upon the basis of the advice provided by these processes, and the
success of any company is owed in substantial measure to the efficacy
of these decision-making systems. It is indeed rare for CEOs to run
companies the size of Enron as personal fiefdoms where every deci-
sion is made on their own accord and without consultation with and
reliance on advisors, internal and external. It is also not typical that
CEOs actively seek out personal accounting or legal advice in addition
to those offered by these substructures. It makes sense, then, for them
to rely on expert advice, and for such reliance to be useful in showing
they did not possess the required knowledge or intent to engage in
criminal conduct.
Enron and Skilling were no different in terms of consultation and
reliance. Skilling had been advised that the Raptors transactions,180
177. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 542 (5th Cir. 2009). The trafficking count
required that Skilling had:
[K]nowingly and wilfully used and employed manipulative and deceptive devices
and contrivances, by use of means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
in violation of Rule 10b-5 of the Rules and Regulations of the SEC . . . in that he
engaged in acts, practices and courses of business which would and did operate as
a fraud on members of the investing public . . . . Specifically, while in possession
of material non-public information, [Skilling] sold shares of Enron stock and gen-
erated total proceeds of $62,626,410.90.
Superseding Indictment at 59, United States v. Causey, No. H-04-25 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 7,
2004).
178. Skilling, 554 F.3d at 542.
179. United States v. Lay, 456 F. Supp. 2d 869, 870 (S.D. Tex. 2006).
180. In defense of Skilling, defense counsel notes:
The Raptors were four structured finance transactions used to hedge . . . the risk
in [ ] various Enron investments. Each Raptor was capitalized by $400 million in
Enron stock and a $30 million investment by LJM. . . . Fastow testified there was a
“secret oral side deal”: LJM was to receive its $30 million investment back, plus
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for example, had been reviewed and approved by Arthur Andersen’s
technical accounting group in Chicago.181 His decision to support the
structures was based on presentations made to him and to the full
Board, which had voted to approve them.182 Skilling’s testimony
showed that he was never told the vehicles were improper.183 As one
senior prosecuting lawyer wrote:
In a trial involving allegations of earnings manipulation and dis-
putes over the defendants’ respective understandings of the appli-
cation of often arcane accounting rules, proof of criminal intent
was of critical importance. Assembling such evidence proved chal-
lenging, however, as both Skilling and Lay clearly relied on the
advice of inside and outside counsel, as well as their auditors.184
This was to be of no avail. The Task Force’s case against Skilling
was predicated primarily on the testimony of cooperating witnesses,
who had all agreed to testify in exchange for leniency and favorable
sentencing recommendations.185 In addition, there is some substance
to the feeling that witnesses, who could have provided exculpatory tes-
timony for Skilling, were intimidated by the Task Force with threats of
indictment.186 Throughout the trial, there was no other direct evi-
dence that linked Skilling with the alleged crimes.
The duplicity of the prosecution can be seen in one simple in-
stance involving document destruction—the very basis for the govern-
ment ringing the death knell for Andersen. Skilling had moved for an
order requiring the production of the raw interview notes of Fastow’s
examination by the government in order to determine how much of
$11 million in profits, before any hedging could begin. . . . Skilling testified that
the Raptors were a self-insurance structure that protected the value of the assets
hedged by Enron: if Enron’s stock in the Raptors went up, the hedging vehicles
(or self-insurance policy) would be capitalized with gains on Enron’s stock; if En-
ron’s stock went down, Enron’s stock contribution to the vehicles would be pro-
tected through the proceeds from the put.
Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 29–31.
181. Id. at 31.
182. Id.
183. Counsel for the United States in the Skilling trial explains:
On June 28, 1999, Skilling and Fastow presented LJM to the Enron Board of
Directors for approval. During the discussion, a board member asked if there
were risks to Enron from LJM, and he was told that the biggest risk was “Wall
Street Journal risk” because it would “look terrible” if the media found out about
LJM. At the meeting, the Board granted Fastow a waiver of Enron’s conflict-of-
interest rules and approved Enron’s investment in LJM.
Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 130, at 40–41.
184. John C. Hueston, Behind the Scenes of the Enron Trial: Creating the Decisive Moments,
44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 197, 197–98 (2007).
185. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 20.
186. Id. at 178–90.
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what was produced had been massaged to support their case. In re-
sponse, the Task Force refused to produce the notes and, in a bizarre
move, claimed it had destroyed all the materials including the elec-
tronic files from computer hard drives. How was this different from
the document destruction engaged in by Andersen? There is a strong
implication that the Task Force had destroyed the electronic copies in
an attempt to prevent Skilling from attacking the credibility of Fastow
and to gain an unfair advantage in the trial. The difference between
aggressive prosecution and obstruction of justice is equally thin here.
D. Deliberate Ignorance
A further taint on the prosecution was the employment of the
“deliberate ignorance” doctrine to get over the minor problem of
Skilling believing his actions were legal.187 In United States v. Here-
dia,188 the court justified the use of the doctrine, stating that “‘know-
ingly’ in criminal statutes is not limited to positive knowledge, but
includes the state of mind of one who does not possess positive knowl-
edge only because he consciously avoided it.”189 In another case, the
court concluded that to “[c]onstru[e] knowingly in a criminal statute
to include willful blindness to the existence of a fact is no radical con-
cept in the law.”190 Key to the doctrine is that the conduct of the de-
fendant “denotes a conscious effort to avoid positive knowledge of a
fact which is an element of an offense charged . . . choosing to remain
ignorant so he can plead lack of positive knowledge in the event he
should be caught.”191 In order to apply the doctrine, the conduct
187. The doctrine allows a defendant to be found to have acted knowingly if he knew
with high probability that a certain fact existed and acted deliberately to avoid obtaining
information that would confirm the fact. The instruction provided to the jury during the
trial was:
The word “knowingly,” as that term is used throughout these instructions, means
that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or
accident. You may find that a defendant had knowledge of a fact if you find that
the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been
obvious to him. While knowledge on the part of the defendant cannot be estab-
lished merely by demonstrating that the defendant was negligent, careless, or
foolish, knowledge can be inferred if the defendant deliberately blinded himself
to the existence of a fact.
United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 548 n.19 (5th Cir. 2009).
188. 483 F.3d 913 (9th Cir. 2007).
189. Id. at 918 (quoting United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702 (9th Cir. 1976)).
190. United States v. Evans, 559 F.2d 244, 246 (5th Cir. 1977).
191. United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1978).
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must be “Don’t tell me, I don’t want to know.”192 Given its broad
sweep, courts have repeatedly emphasized that it should only be given
“in the ‘rare’ instance where there is significant evidence of deliberate
ignorance.”193 The concern is as follows:
Because the instruction permits a jury to convict a defendant with-
out a finding that the defendant was actually aware of the existence
of illegal conduct, the deliberate ignorance instruction poses the
risk that a jury might convict the defendant on a lesser negligence
standard—the defendant should have been aware of the illegal
conduct.194
This is dangerous territory. There is a clear distinction between
failing to ascertain information about a fact and knowing the fact. If
the former equals the latter, there is little sense in requiring the prose-
cution to prove knowledge. It dilutes the requirements of knowledge
to the breaking point. As the court noted in United States v. Mendoza-
Medina,195 “the deliberate ignorance instruction poses the risk that a
jury might convict the defendant on a lesser negligence standard—
the defendant should have been aware of the illegal conduct.”196 Even
setting aside the serious problems with the doctrine, its application in
this case does not satisfy the two required conditions: “(1) the defen-
dant was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of
the illegal conduct; and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to
avoid learning of the illegal conduct.”197 Further, subjective awareness
of illegal activity and purposeful contrivance to avoid learning of ille-
gal conduct can be inferred from the defendant’s inactivity in the face
of a “routine and repeated pattern of suspicious transactions.”198 As
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stressed,
[W]here there is no such evidence, a district court should not give
the instruction because there is no basis for finding deliberate ig-
norance. In such a case, it is usually harmful, because it is likely to
lead the jury to find that the defendant had the requisite knowl-
edge when he in fact did not.199
Is deliberate ignorance even possible in a corporation the size of
Enron with its army of lawyers, accountants, and consultants? Expert
192. Skilling, 554 F.3d at 548 (quoting United States v. de Luna, 815 F.2d 301, 302 (5th
Cir. 1987)).
193. Id. at 549.
194. Id. at 548 (citing United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir.
1990)).
195. 346 F.3d 121 (5th Cir. 2003).
196. Id. at 132.
197. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d at 951.
198. United States v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613, 619–22 (5th Cir. 2007).
199. Skilling, 554 F.3d at 549.
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advice is routinely provided in such large corporations, and there is
no evidence that Skilling deliberately sought to avoid getting ad-
vice.200 There are few facts that justify the conclusion there was a pat-
tern of suspicious transactions that ought to have caused Skilling to
act. Skilling’s defense had never been that he did not know the facts,
but rather that his actions were not illegal. As the Fifth Circuit put it,
“[h]e claims that he ‘agreed’ at trial with the government’s characteri-
zation of him as knowing everything that went on at Enron. He main-
tains that his ‘defense was not that he was unaware of fraud, but that
there was no fraud.’”201 This strikes at the root of deliberate ignorance
because if he had full knowledge of the actions but did not believe
them to be illegal, there is no case. There is obviously no need to
contrive to avoid finding out about legal facts. Having come this far,
the Fifth Circuit gets it horribly wrong:
Even if Skilling is correct that there is little evidence to support a
deliberate ignorance instruction, however, any error in the district
court’s decision to give the instruction was harmless. This is be-
cause the peril to be avoided in cases reversing convictions based
on the deliberate ignorance instruction is not present here. By his
own admission, Skilling claims that he knew of the allegedly illegal
acts, so there is no risk that a jury would rely on the deliberate
ignorance instruction to find that he should have known of the
acts. Consequently, even if the district court erred in giving the
deliberate ignorance instruction in the sense that the instruction
was “not supported by evidence,” any such error was necessarily
harmless.202
This is a terrible travesty. The court completely confuses Skilling’s
case—he did not contend that he knew that the acts were illegal.203
Rather, the claim was that he knew of the acts, which were all legal!204
Skilling appealed, contending inter alia, that the government
used an invalid theory of “honest-services fraud” to convict him. The
jury had convicted Skilling of one count of conspiracy. The problem
was that it did not specify which object of the conspiracy had been
used to convict, and given that one of them was honest services, Skill-
200. Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 9.
201. Skilling, 554 F.3d at 549.
202. Id. at 550 (citation omitted).
203. The court quoted from Skilling’s reply brief and said, “[t]here were very few in-
stances where [he] denied that the alleged conduct happened—he agreed statements were
made, conversations occurred, transactions were approved. Indeed, most were a matter of
written record. [His] position was that the conduct was not criminal or wrongful,” but the
court still got it wrong! Id. at 549 n.20.
204. “His defense was not that he was unaware of fraud, but that there was no fraud. As
we told the jury in opening statement: ‘This is not a case of hear no evil, see no evil. This is
a case of there was no evil.’” Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 4, at 24.
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ing sought to overturn the conviction alleging this was an invalid
theory.205
E. Honest Services
The government’s case against Skilling was based on a conspiracy
to deceive investors about the true performance of Enron’s businesses
by cooking the books to increase reported earnings, reduce reported
losses, maintain an investment-grade credit rating, and improve the
price of Enron’s stock. In doing so, Skilling allegedly breached his
fiduciary duty of “honest services.”206 The truth is that Skilling’s con-
viction is founded on no evidence as to when, how, or why the con-
spiracy was hatched, or anything beyond self-serving testimony from
Fastow claiming he committed any crime. The conviction chillingly
demonstrates the need to clarify the “honest services” theory if it is to
serve any function in distinguishing risky business behavior from crim-
inal behavior.
In United States v. Brown (“Brown”),207 the government’s honest
services theory was rejected by the court in similar circumstances. In
Brown, Enron and Merrill Lynch employees were alleged to have en-
gaged in a conspiracy to defraud Enron and its shareholders by “park-
ing” the now infamous “Nigerian barges” with Merrill Lynch for six
months to artificially boost Enron’s earnings.208 It was alleged that
Merrill paid $7 million to acquire equity in the barges to help Enron
post $12 million in earnings to meet its forecasts.209 The state’s case
was that this was a sham transaction because Enron executives orally
promised Merrill a flat fee of $250,000 and a guaranteed fifteen an-
nual rate of return for the six months it was required to hold the as-
set.210 Further, the government alleged the transaction was in the
nature of a lease rather than a sale because Enron executives prom-
ised it would buy back Merrill’s interest if no third party could be
found.211 The court was unsympathetic to the government’s claims be-
205. The prosecution’s case contained three objects of the conspiracy: (1) to commit
securities fraud, (2) to commit wire fraud to deprive Enron and its shareholders of money
and property, and (3) to commit wire fraud to deprive Enron and its shareholders of the
honest services owed by its employees. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note
130, at 84–85.
206. Id. at 77–78.
207. 459 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2006).
208. Id. at 513.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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cause the facts did not show that the defendants had acted at the ex-
pense of the company or had engaged in bribery and self-dealing.212
Rather, their actions were to the benefit of Enron. According to the
majority,
We do not presume that it is in a corporation’s legitimate interests
ever to misstate earnings—it is not. However, where an employer
intentionally aligns the interests of the employee with a specified
corporate goal, where the employee perceives his pursuit of that
goal as mutually benefitting him and his employer, and where the
employee’s conduct is consistent with that perception of the mu-
tual interest, such conduct is beyond the reach of the honest-ser-
vices theory of fraud as it has hitherto been applied.213
The test for a deprivation of honest services case, which is laid
down in United States v. Rybicki,214 is that the defendant be secretly
acting for his own interest while purporting to act for the employer.
This is consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s ruling in United States v.
Bloom.215
There is no evidence that Skilling engaged in bribery or self deal-
ing. Nor did he act secretly for his own benefit at the expense of En-
ron. There was no deprivation of honest services because, if anything,
Skilling’s interests were too closely aligned with Enron’s. Unless the
causal link between Enron’s ultimate collapse and Skilling’s alleged
actions are conclusively established, the harm was not directly caused
by Skilling’s alleged crimes. In fact, the immediate consequences of
Skilling’s actions were that Enron and its shareholders benefited. The
government sought to distinguish Skilling’s case from Brown by
contending:
[Skilling] violated his fiduciary obligations and his duty to provide
Enron and its shareholders with honest services by setting an im-
proper corporate goal—improperly maintaining and increasing
Enron’s share price and maintaining its credit rating—and then
scheming to achieve that goal by committing, directing, and caus-
ing others to commit a series of fraudulent actions that Skilling
could not have perceived as being consistent with any legitimate
corporate interest.216
They also alleged that in Brown the offenders were “low-level” em-
ployees who were acting on orders from superiors whereas Skilling
212. Id. at 522.
213. Id.
214. 354 F.3d 124, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
215. 149 F.3d 649, 656–57 (7th Cir. 1998).
216. Brief for the United States as Appellee, supra note 130, at 80.
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was not acting in pursuance of goals imposed on him by those above
him.217
The Fifth Circuit analyzed Brown as creating the following ingre-
dients for establishing liability:
[W]hen an employer (1) creates a particular goal, (2) aligns the
employees’ interests with the employer’s interest in achieving that
goal, and (3) has higher-level management sanction improper conduct
to reach the goal, then lower-level employees following their boss’s
direction are not liable for honest-services fraud. Thus, we reversed
the convictions of the employees in Brown because they were acting
both in the corporate interest and at the direction of their
employer.218
Thereafter, the court manufactured an exception for honest ser-
vices fraud thus: “In essence, Brown created an exception for honest-
services fraud where an employer not only aligns its interests with the
interests of its employees but also sanctions the fraudulent conduct,
i.e., where the corporate decisionmakers, who supervised the employ-
ees being prosecuted, specifically authorized the activity.”219
By their own logic, the employer, Enron, should sanction the
fraudulent conduct and the decisionmaker, Skilling, should have spe-
cifically authorized the activity. Given the facts of the case, this might
be a bridge too far. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit would have none of
it:
Skilling misconstrues our holding in Brown . . . because he fails to
recognize the manner in which the court in Brown explicitly distin-
guished [United States v. Gray]220. . . . Gray and Brown present differ-
ent facts; in Gray, the basketball coaches acted on their own
volition, without any direction from their supervisors, while in
Brown, a lower-level Enron employee acted at the direction of Fas-
tow, who as a decisionmaker had the authority to tell his employee
that Enron sanctioned the particular fraud in question. The differ-
ence is that in Brown, the employee undertook the specific fraud in
question at the direction of the employer, while this did not occur in
Gray. In essence, because the Enron decisionmaker in Brown sanc-
tioned the specific fraudulent conduct of its employee, the em-
ployee (and the other conspirators) did not deprive Enron of its
honest services. Thus, for example, had the basketball coaches in
Gray showed that the President of Baylor University or other deci-
sionmakers specifically directed their fraudulent conduct, then
they would not have been liable for honest-services fraud.221
217. Id. at 80–81.
218. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 545 (5th Cir. 2009).
219. Id.
220. 96 F.3d 769 (5th Cir. 1996).
221. Id. at 546 (footnote omitted).
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Having come up with this sword, the court then foisted Skilling
on it:
Skilling’s convictions must stand. First, Enron created a goal of
meeting certain earnings projections. Second, Enron aligned its in-
terests with Skilling’s personal interests, e.g., through his compen-
sation structure, leading Skilling to undertake fraudulent means to
achieve the goal. Third—and fatally to Skilling’s argument—no
one at Enron sanctioned Skilling’s improper conduct. That is,
Skilling does not allege that the Board of Directors or any other
decisionmaker specifically directed the improper means that he
undertook to achieve his goals. Of course, a senior executive can-
not wear his “executive” hat to sanction a fraudulent scheme and
then wear his “employee” hat to perpetuate that fraud. Therefore,
it is not a matter of Skilling setting the corporation’s policy him-
self. Instead, the question is whether anyone who supervised Skill-
ing specifically directed his actions—such as how Fastow
sanctioned the scheme in Brown. Skilling never alleged that he en-
gaged in his conduct at the explicit direction of anyone, and there-
fore he cannot avail himself of the exception from Brown.222
There is one problem: Where is the “fraudulent” action under-
taken by Skilling to achieve the corporate goal of achieving earnings?
There is too facile an assumption of fraud and impropriety without
the evidence to back it up. The application of the honest services the-
ory in cases where bad business decisions caused financial losses dan-
gerously corrodes the very basis of criminal liability by conflating
moral wrongfulness with risk taking. It must be clarified if it has to
serve the intended purpose. Further, even upon the court’s reasoning,
would it not be possible to believe that the board of directors, whose
task it was to supervise Skilling, sub silentio, directed and approved his
actions?
As the above analysis shows, there is little morally wrongful in
Skilling’s conduct.223 There was no suggestion that Skilling had any-
222. Id. The court also stated:
The elements of honest-services wire fraud applicable here are (1) a material
breach of a fiduciary duty imposed under state law, including duties defined by
the employer-employee relationship, [and] (2) that results in a detriment to the
employer. Brown sheds light on the employer-employee relationship by creating
an exception for when the employer specifically directs the fraudulent conduct.
Further, it is a sufficient detriment for an employee, contrary to his duty of hon-
esty, to withhold material information, i.e., information that he had reason to
believe would lead a reasonable employer to change its conduct. Accordingly, the
jury was entitled to convict Skilling of conspiracy to commit honest-services wire
fraud on these elements.
Id. at 547 (footnotes omitted).
223. As Malcolm Gladwell wrote on his website, “Can anyone explain—in plain lan-
guage—what it is Jeff Skilling and Co. did wrong? . . . The question is strictly a legal one:
according to the way the accounting rules were written at the time, what specific transgres-
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thing to gain at the expense of Enron by his alleged crimes. In fact, all
the evidence pointed to Skilling working for the success of Enron. His
alleged misstatements were in the nature of sales talk and puffery, and
there is no evidence there was any intention to deceive. The Skilling
case demonstrates the perils of letting the notion of harm alone dic-
tate criminalization. The enormous harm suffered by people in Hous-
ton appears to have colored the court’s perceptions about the moral
wrongfulness of Skilling’s actions. If Skilling was indeed responsible
for the harm, there were other avenues like civil suits to recover for
the harm caused. The criminal law ought to require more than mere
harm to deprive individuals of their liberty. If Skilling has to suffer the
fate of a murderer who has killed five people (based on his sentence),
surely there must be the same degree of moral wrongfulness to his
actions?
To sum up, Skilling’s conduct was, at worst, an aggressive inter-
pretation of existing law. The government did not adduce any evi-
dence that he intentionally committed acts that he knew to be wrong.
It is arguable that overly optimistic and egregiously risky actions ought
not to be viewed kindly by the law and that CEOs who are guilty of
these faults should not be allowed to hold similar positions. If such
conduct has to be criminalized upon the justification that non-con-
senting individuals were harmed, conviction without imprisonment
could achieve the purposes of criminalization at lower cost. Skilling
would have had his earning capacity destroyed by conviction alone.
An order of disgorgement would have reduced him to penury. To the
extent it is necessary, other legal impediments could have been im-
posed on him by regulatory agencies. In addition, if members of soci-
ety wanted to impose other consequential sanctions, then they could
do so upon conviction without sending him to jail.
Conclusion
Criminalizing risky actions undertaken by corporate fiduciaries
confuses ex post harm with moral wrongfulness. The scholarly and
policy-making communities conflate blameworthiness with imprison-
ment, explaining the inordinate focus on ratcheting up prison terms.
Such a view assumes that physical confinement is essential to achiev-
ing the objectives of criminalization when the particular nature of cor-
sions were Skilling guilty of that merited twenty-four years in prison?” Malcolm Gladwell,
Enron, GLADWELL.COM, Jan. 3, 2007, http://gladwell.typepad.com/gladwellcom/2007/01/
enron.html.
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porate governance offenders facilitates the realization of those
objectives without the need for imprisonment. To the extent that
criminalization is necessary, the societal goals the law articulates
through the criminal law can be realized through conviction alone
without the need for imprisonment. Conviction is sufficiently liberty
depriving for corporate governance offenders insofar as it destroys
their ability to hold fiduciary positions, thereby eliminating the possi-
bility for further social harm. The disutility caused by conviction alone
is a sufficient deterrent. If the law stops at conviction, deterrent objec-
tives can be achieved without the need for the state to bear the cost of
imprisonment. The possibility of imposing consequential sanctions
satisfies the retributive dimension. Lastly, the incapacitation objective
is achieved by legal impediments.
The criminal law is a blunt instrument when applied to problems
created by agency costs because of the crudeness of its sanctions and
their relatively high cost without demonstrable gain. Further, since
white-collar wrongs are not always morally wrong, the criminal law’s
expressive and coercive powers are seriously undermined by the crude
application of criminal sanctions. Stopping at conviction without auto-
matic imprisonment minimizes the erosion of expressive power by fa-
cilitating the deployment of consequential sanctions like shaming,
which allows for the decentralized enforcement of the asserted norms.
Thus, conviction without incarceration offers the second-best alterna-
tive to decriminalization.
